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UNDULY BURDENING ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE
Mark Strasser*

INTRODUCTION
The undue burden standard is the current test to determine whether abortion
regulations pass constitutional muster.1 But the function, meaning, and application
of that test have varied over time, which undercuts the test’s usefulness and the ability
of legislatures to know which regulations pass constitutional muster. Even more
confusing, the Court has refused to apply the test in light of its express terms, which
cannot fail to yield surprising conclusions and undercut confidence in the Court. The
Court must not only clarify what the test means and how it is to be used, but must
also formulate that test so that it accurately conveys the conditions under which
regulations will be upheld. Otherwise, the Court will not only continue to mislead
the country about the content and breadth of abortion rights, but will also further
convince the populace that the Court is simply set on promoting a political agenda.
Part I of this Article discusses how the term “undue burden” was used and what
it meant in several cases preceding Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey.2 Part II discusses how the undue burden test was construed in Casey and subsequent cases, noting some of the internal inconsistencies in the Court’s approach.
The Article concludes that, unless the Court clarifies what the test is and then applies
it consistently, courts and state legislatures will continue not to understand what the
Constitution requires, and the Court will not only continue to be criticized both by
those favoring and those disfavoring abortion rights but will also continue to undermine public confidence in the Court’s impartiality.
I. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNDUE BURDEN TEST
In several relatively early abortion cases, members of the Court discussed undue
burdens on abortion.3 The Justices not only disagreed about which conditions imposed
* Trustee Professor of Law at Capital University Law School.
1
Harris v. W. Ala. Women’s Ctr., 139 S. Ct. 2606, 2607 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[U]nder the ‘undue burden’ standard adopted by this Court, a restriction on abortion . . . is
unconstitutional if ‘the “purpose or effect”’ of the provision “‘is to place a substantial obstacle
in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”’” (quoting
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016))), denying cert. to 900
F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2018).
2
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3
See Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 147 (1976).
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undue burdens but also about the role of the undue burden test itself.4 Regrettably,
the Justices often failed to articulate (and possibly appreciate) these very different
understandings of “undue burden,” which led to confused and confusing usages of
the same term.5
A. Differing Usages of the Term “Undue Burden”
Members of the Court have long disagreed about which state regulations unduly
burden abortion rights and about the significance of such a finding. Some have
suggested that a finding of an undue burden means that the challenged regulation
violates constitutional guarantees, while others have suggested that such a finding
means that closer scrutiny should be employed to determine whether the regulation
passes muster.6 With such a lack of agreement about what essential terms mean,
abortion jurisprudence could not help but be confused and confusing.
The Court first discussed the imposition of an undue burden on abortion rights
in Bellotti v. Baird.7 At issue was a Massachusetts statute requiring parental notification in cases involving a minor seeking an abortion.8 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts had interpreted the statute to require parental notification “for
every nonemergency abortion where the mother is less than eighteen years of age and
unmarried.”9 The question at hand was whether such a broad notification requirement infringed upon minors’ abortion rights.10
When analyzing whether such a requirement violated constitutional guarantees,
the Bellotti Court acknowledged that there were important differences between
minors and adults, offering three reasons that minors’ rights were not as robust as
those of adults: “[T]he peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make
critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental
role in child rearing.”11 However, the Court also made clear that “[a] child, merely on
account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.”12
4

See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977) (majority upholding a Connecticut
regulation that limited Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions); id. at 483 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (arguing that the Connecticut law posed a significant burden on impoverished
pregnant women).
5
Some members of the Court appreciate that the term “undue burden” has not been used
consistently. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (plurality opinion) (“The concept of an undue
burden has been utilized by the Court as well as individual Members of the Court, including
two of us, in ways that could be considered inconsistent.”).
6
See infra notes 33–50 and accompanying text.
7
443 U.S. 622 (1979).
8
Id. at 646.
9
Id. (quoting Baird v. Att’y Gen., 360 N.E.2d 288, 294 (Mass. 1977)).
10
See id. at 631–32.
11
Id. at 634.
12
Id. at 633.
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In discerning what the Constitution requires, the Court seemed to balance two
distinct considerations. Some minors need parental advice and guidance13 about the
best course of action when deciding a momentous matter such as whether to give
birth to a child.14 However, other minors possessing sufficient judgment and maturity to make the decision themselves not only may not need parental input but also
should not in effect be denied the opportunity to make that decision merely because
they strongly disagree with their parents about the best course of action to take.15
The Bellotti Court was not without guidance from previous decisions when
seeking to determine whether the Massachusetts parental notification law violated
constitutional guarantees. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
the Court held that “the State may not impose a blanket provision . . . requiring the
consent of a parent or person in loco parentis as a condition for abortion of an unmarried minor during the first 12 weeks of her pregnancy.”16 While not dispositive, the
Danforth holding was instructive because it made clear that the Constitution does
not permit a state to shift all decision-making regarding a minor’s pregnancy to the
minor’s parents. The Bellotti Court reasoned that “young pregnant minors, especially
those living at home, are particularly vulnerable to their parents’ efforts to obstruct
both an abortion and their access to court.”17 That vulnerability suggests that in some
cases parental notification would result in “the ‘absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto’
that was found impermissible in Danforth.”18 The Bellotti Court concluded that
Danforth counseled against the constitutionality of the Massachusetts statute precisely because some mature, informed minors would be precluded from exercising
their constitutional rights.19
The Danforth Court had reasoned that the state did not have the power to
transfer to the parents the absolute right to determine whether their minor child may
13

See id. at 637 (“[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children
justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors.”); see also id. at 635 (“[D]uring the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”).
14
See id. at 642 (“[T]here are few situations in which denying a minor the right to make
an important decision will have consequences so grave and indelible.”).
15
Id. at 643–44 (“In sum, the procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental
consent does not in fact amount to the ‘absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto’ that was found
impermissible in Danforth.” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 74 (1976))).
16
428 U.S. at 74.
17
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
18
Id. at 644 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74).
19
See id. at 643–44; cf. Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The UndueBurden Test After Casey/Hellerstedt, 52 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 421,
436–37 (2017) (“[T]he Court had struck down parental and spousal consent laws that did not
formally prohibit the procedure because they would effectively bar some women from
seeking abortions.”).
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obtain an abortion: “[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician
and his patient to terminate the patient’s pregnancy, regardless of the reason for withholding the consent.”20 In so holding, the Danforth Court was not stating that all minors
may exercise their abortion rights whenever they wish regardless of the circumstances
or the minor’s maturity.21 Rather, the Court was suggesting that the pregnant minor has
a constitutionally protected abortion right22 that may be exercised under certain conditions, parental disagreement with the content of that decision notwithstanding.23
Danforth and Bellotti are distinguishable, because Danforth involved parental
consent,24 whereas Bellotti involved parental notification.25 The law at issue in
Danforth might not only have required that the minor reveal her pregnancy and her
desire to end it but also in effect have required the minor to convince her parent that
abortion was the best solution.26 A notification statute would not require that the
parent agree with the decision to abort.27 Nonetheless, the Bellotti Court noted that
while a notification provision did not give the pregnant minor’s parent the legal
authority to refuse to permit the abortion, such a provision as a practical matter
might have made a minor’s obtaining of an abortion impossible, even if that minor
was capable of making an adult decision,28 and even if not obtaining the abortion
would have dire consequences for that minor.29
20

Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
Id. at 75 (“We emphasize that our holding that § 3(4) is invalid does not suggest that
every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of her
pregnancy.”).
22
See id. at 74 (“Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights.”).
23
See id. at 75 (“Any independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the
minor daughter’s pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of privacy of the competent
minor mature enough to have become pregnant.”).
24
Id. at 72 (“Section 3(4) requires, with respect to the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, where
the woman is unmarried and under the age of 18 years, the written consent of a parent or
person in loco parentis unless, again, ‘the abortion is certified by a licensed physician as
necessary in order to preserve the life of the mother.’”).
25
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 631 (1979) (“[A]s construed by the Supreme Judicial
Court, § 12S requires parental notice in virtually every case where the parent is available.”).
26
See Amanda M. Lanham, Note, Parental Notification Under the Undue Burden Standard:
Is a Bypass Mechanism Required?, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 551, 551, 557–78 (2006) (“Parental
consent laws require a pregnant minor to obtain the consent, usually written, of at least one
parent or custodial guardian prior to undergoing an abortion procedure.”).
27
Id. at 551.
28
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647 (“If she satisfies the court that she is mature and well
enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on her own, the court must
authorize her to act without parental consultation or consent.”).
29
Id. at 642 (“Moreover, the potentially severe detriment facing a pregnant woman is not
mitigated by her minority. Indeed, considering her probable education, employment skills,
21
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The Bellotti Court held that a pregnant minor must be given the opportunity to
prove whether “she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion
decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of her parents’ wishes”
or, alternatively, “that even if she is not able to make this decision independently,
the desired abortion would be in her best interests.”30 Where a minor can make such
a showing before a judge, “the court must authorize her to act without parental
consultation or consent.”31 A state that fails to afford the pregnant minor the opportunity to make the requisite showing and, where appropriate, obtain an abortion
authorization without parental notification or consent thereby “impose[s] an undue
burden upon the exercise by minors of the right to seek an abortion.”32
Here, the Bellotti Court used the term “undue burden” to indicate that the state
regulation violated constitutional guarantees.33 That determination was made in light
of other factors: (1) the pregnant minor had a constitutional right to obtain an abortion;34 and (2) the enforcement of a parental notification requirement might have
prevented the minor from exercising that right, even where doing so would have been
in her best interest or even where she was capable of making an informed, deliberate,
and mature choice.35 The finding of an undue burden triggered not closer scrutiny
of the regulation but, instead, a conclusion that the regulation abridged a constitutional right and thus was unconstitutional.36
Yet, not all members of the Court used the term “undue burden” to indicate that
a particular regulation does not pass constitutional muster.37 In her concurring and
financial resources, and emotional maturity, unwanted motherhood may be exceptionally
burdensome for a minor.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973))).
30
Id. at 643–44 (footnote omitted).
31
Id. at 647.
32
Id. (emphasis added).
33
Cf. April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant
Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 185 n.177 (2007)
(“[T]he ‘unduly burdensome’ standard of the Court seems to be more conclusory than a
clearly articulated analytical framework.”).
34
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642.
35
See id. at 647–48. The Court takes a different approach when the minor is not sufficiently
mature to make the decision herself. See H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (“[A]
statute setting out a ‘mere requirement of parental notice’ does not violate the constitutional
rights of an immature, dependent minor.” (quoting Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 640)).
36
See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 648 (“[T]he constitutional right to seek an abortion may not
be unduly burdened by state-imposed conditions . . . .”).
37
It may be that Justice O’Connor subsequently changed her view. See Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“A finding of
an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because the means chosen by the State
to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice,
not hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential life or some other
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dissenting opinion in Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, Justice
O’Connor wrote:
I believe that the second-trimester hospitalization requirement
imposed by § 188.025 does not impose an undue burden on the
limited right to undergo an abortion. Assuming, arguendo, that the
requirement was an undue burden, it would nevertheless
‘reasonably relat[e] to the preservation and protection of maternal
health.’ I therefore dissent from the Court’s judgment that the
requirement is unconstitutional.38
Justice O’Connor argued that the regulations were reasonably related to the protection and preservation of pregnant women’s health, did not impose an undue burden
upon abortion rights, and were not unconstitutional.39 But, she noted, even if the challenged hospital stay requirement imposed an undue burden, that regulation would
nonetheless pass constitutional muster.40
An important difference between the Bellotti majority’s and Justice O’Connor’s
understandings of the undue burden test was that in Justice O’Connor’s view, a regulation can impose an undue burden and nonetheless pass muster, which meant that the
conclusion that a law imposed an undue burden was not equivalent to a conclusion
that constitutional guarantees had been violated.41 Basically, Justice O’Connor used
the “undue burden” test to determine when abortion regulations should be examined
with close scrutiny—she noted in her City of Akron dissent the “requirement that
state interference ‘infringe substantially’ or ‘heavily burden’ a right before heightened scrutiny is applied.”42 Where there had been no substantive infringement or
undue burden, the Court’s “inquiry [was] limited to whether the state law bears ‘some
rational relationship to legitimate state purposes,’”43 which in most if not all cases
would result in the statute or ordinance being upheld.44
valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”).
38
462 U.S. 477, 505 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
See id.
42
City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 462 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
43
Id. (quoting San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973)).
44
See id. at 453 (“Our recent cases indicate that a regulation imposed on ‘a lawful
abortion “is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion.”’”
(quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977))); FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993) (“[A] statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor
infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld . . . if there is any reasonably
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To support her understanding of the undue burden test, Justice O’Connor cited
Maher v. Roe,45 which involved Connecticut’s refusal to fund abortions that were not
medically indicated.46 Citing Bellotti, the Maher Court explained that “a requirement
for a lawful abortion ‘is not unconstitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to
seek an abortion.’”47
The position that an abortion regulation passes constitutional muster unless
unduly burdening abortion rights is consistent with the position that a regulation imposing an undue burden on abortion rights48 unconstitutionally infringes upon those
rights. If a necessary and sufficient condition for a finding of unconstitutionality is
that an undue burden had been placed on the right, then the term “undue burden”
indicates that a statute or regulation is unconstitutional. If, instead, the imposition
of an undue burden is a necessary but not sufficient condition for such a finding, then
the term does not indicate that the statute or regulation at issue fails to pass muster.49
An important difference between the ways the Bellotti majority and Justice O’Connor
used the term “undue burden” was that the majority suggested that a statute imposing an undue burden on abortion rights was a sufficient condition for that statute’s
unconstitutionality, whereas Justice O’Connor believed that the imposition of such
a burden was a necessary but not sufficient condition for its unconstitutionality.50
conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”); Stephen
G. Gilles, Restoring Casey’s Undue-Burden Standard After Whole Women’s Health v.
Hellerstedt, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701, 744–45 (2017) (“Regulations that did not impose
an undue burden, she maintained, should be subject only to highly deferential rational-basis
review.”); Emma Freeman, Note, Giving Casey Its Bite Back: The Role of Rational Basis
Review in Undue Burden Analysis, 48 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 279, 282
(2013) (“To uphold state action under rational basis, a court must only determine that the
challenged legislation is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.”).
45
Akron, 462 U.S. at 453 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
46
Maher, 432 U.S. at 466 (“A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits
state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are ‘medically necessary,’
a term defined to include psychiatric necessity.” (footnote omitted) (quoting CONN.WELFARE
DEP’T, 3 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL § 275 (1975))).
47
Id. at 473 (quoting Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)).
48
The Court examines whether a statute imposes an undue burden in other contexts as
well. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090–91, 2099–2100 (2018) (upholding a statute imposing a sales and use tax on sellers who do not have a physical presence in
the state after finding that the statute did not impose an undue burden on interstate commerce);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 665–68 (2011) (minority opinion) (analyzing
whether “application of the Confrontation Clause to forensic evidence would impose an
undue burden on the prosecution”).
49
Ironically, neither the Maher Court nor Justice O’Connor seemed willing to countenance
the possibility that an abortion regulation would be unconstitutional because it was not
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Cf. Akron, 462 U.S. at 461–66 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that not every fundamental right demands the highest level of scrutiny,
but asserting that abortion cases require some heightened scrutiny).
50
See id. at 453 (suggesting that abortion regulations pass muster unless unduly
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B. Who Should Be Held Responsible When Women Do Not Have Access to
Abortion?
Whether abortion rights have been unduly burdened depends in part on whether
the state has done anything to prevent women from obtaining abortions.51 But merely
because the state has done something resulting in fewer women having abortions does
not establish that the state has unduly burdened abortion rights. Whether abortion
rights have been unduly burdened will depend upon a number of factors including
the anticipated benefits of the restriction and, perhaps, background understandings
regarding the state’s obligations to its citizens.
The Court tried to explain what qualified as unduly burdening abortion rights
in Maher v. Roe.52 At issue was whether Connecticut’s refusal to fund non-medically
necessary abortions imposed an undue burden on the right to abortion.53 The Maher
Court began its analysis by noting that “[t]he Constitution imposes no obligation on
the States to pay the pregnancy-related medical expenses of indigent women, or indeed
to pay any of the medical expenses of indigents.”54 However, the state’s lack of obligation to fund such medical care did not end the analysis, because “when a State decides
to alleviate some of the hardships of poverty by providing medical care, the manner
in which it dispenses benefits is subject to constitutional limitations.”55 Thus, once
the state has decided to fund some indigent medical care, the Constitution imposes
burdening the right). In Danforth, the Court suggested that “the outright legislative proscription
of saline fails as a reasonable regulation for the protection of maternal health. It comes into
focus, instead, as an unreasonable or arbitrary regulation designed to inhibit, and having the
effect of inhibiting, the vast majority of abortions after the first 12 weeks.” See Planned
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79 (1976). The Danforth Court’s comment
suggests that the Missouri statute failed rational basis review. It is simply unclear whether
Justice O’Connor would have been willing to strike an abortion regulation under rational
basis review. Cf. Akron, 462 U.S. at 467 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he regulation has a
‘rational relation’ to a valid state objective of ensuring the health and welfare of its citizens.”)
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). By citing Williamson, Justice
O’Connor suggests that she employed deferential rational basis when examining statutes
designed to promote maternal health. See H. Jefferson Powell, Reasoning About the Irrational:
The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 217, 245–51
(2011) (discussing the “extraordinarily deferential form of judicial review that the Court
employed in Williamson”).
51
See Maher, 432 U.S. at 473.
52
See id. at 473–74 (“[T]he right protects the woman from unduly burdensome interference
with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on
the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to
implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds.”).
53
See id. at 466 (“A regulation of the Connecticut Welfare Department limits state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are ‘medically necessary,’ a term defined
to include psychiatric necessity.”).
54
Id. at 469.
55
Id. at 469–70.
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some limitations on the method adopted to determine what will be covered and what
will not.56
The Maher Court read the existing jurisprudence to “recognize a constitutionally
protected interest ‘in making certain kinds of important decisions’ free from governmental compulsion.”57 That includes the right to abortion, which “protects the woman
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy.”58 But, the Court reasoned, “[a]n indigent woman who desires
an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to
fund childbirth; she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the
service she desires.”59 Basically, the Maher Court did not dispute that the indigent
woman might be unable to obtain abortions without government funding,60 but
suggested that the government was not burdening the right to abortion by virtue of
refusing to provide that funding.61
In cases where a state abortion ban is not at issue,62 the Maher approach requires
some plausible way to distinguish between those times when the government may be
held responsible for a woman’s inability to obtain an abortion and those times when
the government should not be held responsible. Else, the Maher rationale would suggest, for example, that Bellotti was wrongly decided.63 Even if it were true that a
parent who had been notified of her child’s desire to obtain an abortion might, as a
practical matter, make it very difficult if not impossible for her child to do so, Maher
counsels that the interference should be attributed to a private party (the parent)
56

See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REV. 96, 99 (1980) (“The state
cannot limit grants of benefits by making constitutionally forbidden classifications. While
the state has considerable freedom in making public funding choices, these choices must be
based on constitutionally permissible criteria.”).
57
Maher, 432 U.S. at 473 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600, 599 n.24, 600
n.26 (1977)).
58
Id. at 473–74.
59
Id. at 474.
60
See id. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The stark reality for too many, not just ‘some,’
indigent pregnant women is that indigency makes access to competent licensed physicians
not merely ‘difficult’ but ‘impossible.’”).
61
Cf. Mary Ziegler, Rethinking an Undue Burden: Whole Woman’s Health’s New Approach to Fundamental Rights, 85 TENN. L. REV. 461, 471 (2018).
Connecticut argued that in Maher, any obstacles had nothing to do
with the government. Women were poor for other reasons. Doctors’ inability to perform the procedure for a discount or work out a payment
plan also could not be blamed on the government. This, in Connecticut’s
view, reflected the true meaning of an unconstitutional undue burden.
Id.
62
Cf. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 464 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The abortion cases demonstrate that an ‘undue burden’ has been
found for the most part in situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision.”), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63
For a discussion of Bellotti, see supra notes 7–36 and accompanying text.
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rather than the state and thus would not constitute governmental interference with
a minor’s abortion rights.64
The Maher analysis of whether abortion rights have been unduly burdened focuses
on: (1) the extent to which the challenged action makes obtaining an abortion more
difficult, and (2) whether that increased difficulty is appropriately attributed to the government.65 Even if the increased burden is significant, the Court may nonetheless believe that the state is not responsible for having made an abortion more difficult to
obtain.66 Unless the government is responsible for the increased difficulty in obtaining
an abortion, the government will not be said to have unduly burdened abortion rights.
In City of Akron, the Court considered whether requiring a hospital stay for a
second-term abortion involved a state-imposed, heavy burden on a woman’s right
to choose an abortion.67 The City of Akron Court reasoned that “[t]here can be no
doubt that § 1870.03’s second-trimester hospitalization requirement places a significant obstacle in the path of women seeking an abortion”68 if only because such a
requirement would substantially increase the costs of the procedure.69 However,
Justice O’Connor explained in dissent that “an ‘undue burden’ has been found for the
most part in situations involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the
abortion decision.”70 Because there was no evidence that any of the hospitals had
denied anyone an abortion71 and because the hospital stay requirement was reasonably
calculated to promoting maternal health,72 Justice O’Connor concluded that “the
hospitalization requirement does not impose an undue burden.”73
64

Cf. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74. The Court reviewed its abortion cases to distinguish
“direct state interference” with “freedom of choice” from “state encouragement of an alternative . . . policy.” Id. at 473, 475.
65
See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
66
In Geduldig v. Aiello, the Court upheld California’s refusal to include pregnancy complications from coverage under its disability insurance system. See 417 U.S. 484, 486, 497
(1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92
Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e), as recognized in Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678–79 (1983). The Court explained:
There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured
by the program worked to discriminate against any definable group or
class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that group or
class from the program. There is no risk from which men are protected
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are
protected and men are not.
Id. at 496–97.
67
See Akron, 462 U.S. at 426.
68
Id. at 434.
69
See id. at 434–35 (“[T]here was testimony that a second-trimester abortion costs more
than twice as much in a hospital as in a clinic.”).
70
Id. at 464 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
71
Id. at 466.
72
See id. at 467.
73
Id. at 466.
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The City of Akron hospital stay requirement illustrates how the Maher approach
might be used to determine whether the government has unduly burdened abortion
rights. One question focuses on the question of degree—is the burden sufficiently
substantial to qualify as an undue burden? Justice O’Connor suggested that a regulation that drives up costs but does not constitute an outright ban or severe limitation
does not meet the test for constituting an undue burden.74 Suppose, however, that
Justice O’Connor had thought that such a regulation would constitute an undue
burden for a subset of the population, e.g., for those without sufficient means, such
that the increased cost would, in effect, preclude their obtaining an abortion.75 The
other question focuses on whether the inability of that subset of women to obtain an
abortion should be attributed to the state and thus might amount to a governmentimposed undue burden on the right to abortion. Just as the Maher Court suggested
that the state was not responsible for the inability of indigent women to pay for
abortion services,76 the City of Akron Court might have said (but did not say) that the
state was not responsible for the inability of indigent women to pay for the increased
cost of abortion services where a hospital stay was required.
In City of Akron, the Court believed that requiring hospital stays for all secondterm abortions made the procedure too costly without adequate justification77 and
thus imposed an undue burden. However, Justice O’Connor rejected that those very
regulations imposed an undue burden, because she believed the requirement was a
legitimate health measure rather than a pretextual attempt to burden abortions.78 In
74

See Dorothy E. Roberts, Sandra Day O’Connor, Conservative Discourse, and
Reproductive Freedom, 13 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 95, 98–99 (1991).
It is easier to catalogue the types of government action that O’Connor
does not consider to be an undue burden. She has never acknowledged
that significant cost increases constitute a burden on abortion. Thus, she
disagreed with the majority in Akron, which struck down a regulation
requiring that doctors perform all second trimester abortions in hospitals
because it would have substantially increased the cost of abortions.
Id. at 98.
75
Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (majority
opinion) (“The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute
operates; it begins there. Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its
impact on those whose conduct it affects.”).
76
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469 (1977).
77
See Akron, 462 U.S. at 436 (“[E]xperience indicates that D&E may be performed safely
on an outpatient basis in appropriate nonhospital facilities. The evidence is strong enough
to have convinced the APHA to abandon its prior recommendation of hospitalization for all
second-trimester abortions.”); id. at 437 (“We conclude, therefore, that ‘present medical knowledge,’ convincingly undercuts Akron’s justification for requiring that all second-trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital.” (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973))).
78
See id. at 467 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he regulation has a ‘rational relation’ to
a valid state objective of ensuring the health and welfare of its citizens.”) (citing Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)); see also id. (“In Simopoulos v. Virginia, the Court
upholds the State’s stringent licensing requirements that will clearly involve greater cost
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addition, Justice O’Connor took seriously the Maher position that the government
did not have the obligation to fund abortions even if funding other medical procedures for the indigent.79
The Court’s position that the State is permitted to encourage childbirth over
abortion can have important implications. Consider Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, which involved a Missouri statute that
prohibit[ed] the use of public employees and facilities to perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother’s life,
and it prohibit[ed] the use of public funds, employees, or facilities for the purpose of “encouraging or counseling” a woman to
have an abortion not necessary to save her life.80
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the ban on public employees’ performing abortions, reasoning that “the ban on the use of public facilities ‘could prevent
a woman’s chosen doctor from performing an abortion because of his unprivileged
status at other hospitals or because a private hospital adopted a similar anti-abortion
stance.’”81 But the Webster Court reasoned that “the State’s decision here to use
public facilities and staff to encourage childbirth over abortion ‘places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy.’”82
Missouri had not imposed a ban on abortion in the state, although it had precluded
public facilities from providing that procedure.83 Yet, such a preclusion might have
because the State’s licensing scheme ‘is not an unreasonable means of furthering the State’s
compelling interest in’ preserving maternal health.” (quoting 462 U.S. 506, 519 (1983))).
79
See Akron, 462 U.S. at 466 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“We must always be mindful that
‘[t]he Constitution does not compel a state to fine-tune its statutes so as to encourage or
facilitate abortions. To the contrary, state action “encouraging childbirth except in the most
urgent circumstances” is “rationally related to the legitimate government objective of protecting
potential life.”’” (citations omitted) (quoting H. L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981))).
Justice O’Connor’s application of the “undue burden” concept in
practice has been far more troublesome than its invocation in the abstract.
First, she has never acknowledged that significant cost increases constitute “burdens” on abortion. Yet, as every anti-abortion legislator well
knows, one of the best ways to deter abortion is to raise the price.
Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an Audience of One,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 138 (1989).
80
492 U.S. 490, 501 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citation omitted) (quoting MO. REV.
STAT. §§ 188.205, .215 (1986)).
81
Id. at 509 (majority opinion) (citing Reprod. Health Serv. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071,
1081 (8th Cir. 1988)).
82
Id. (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)).
83
See § 188.215 (“It shall be unlawful for any public facility to be used for the purpose of
performing or assisting an abortion not necessary to save the life of the mother or for the purpose of encouraging or counseling a woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life.”).
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prevented a significant percentage of women from obtaining abortions if many of
the private hospitals did not provide abortions, e.g., because they were religiously
affiliated.84 Even more women would have been prevented from obtaining abortions
if it were also true that in particular parts of the state there were few if any clinics
providing abortions,85 and most or all of the hospitals in the area were either public
or private and religiously opposed to providing that procedure.86
When justifying the claim that the government was merely encouraging women
to choose alternatives to abortion, the Webster Court cited to Harris v. McRae.87 Harris
involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment,88 which had
denied Medicaid funding for many “medically necessary abortions.”89 The Harris
Court had cited to Maher, noting that “even though the Connecticut regulation favored
childbirth over abortion by means of subsidization of one and not the other, the
Court in Maher concluded that the regulation did not impinge on the constitutional
freedom recognized in Wade because it imposed no governmental restriction on
access to abortions.”90 The Harris Court believed Maher to be dispositive, reasoning
that “[t]he Hyde Amendment, like the Connecticut welfare regulation at issue in Maher,
places no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public interest.”91 Here, the
government was not imposing a burden on the right to obtain an abortion, e.g., by
84

See Elizabeth B. Deutsch, Note, Expanding Conscience, Shrinking Care: The Crisis
in Access to Reproductive Care and the Affordable Care Act’s Nondiscrimination Mandate,
124 YALE L.J. 2470, 2477 (2015) (“As religious refusals and hospital consolidations have
expanded, together they have helped to produce a crisis in access to reproductive care.”);
Taylor Luckey Brennan, Note, “Souls Aren’t Saved Just in Church Buildings”: Defining
“Religious Exercise” Under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 69
DUKE L.J. 1353, 1387 n.201 (2020) (“[I]t is now the regular practice of states to exempt
religiously affiliated hospitals from providing women with abortions or other contraceptive
services when the health care facility objects on religious grounds.”).
85
Cf. Nicole Ratelle, Note, A Positive Right to Abortion: Rethinking Roe v. Wade in the
Context of Medication Abortion, 20 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 195, 208 (2018) (“[A] . . . challenge
to the Idaho statute would be required to evaluate how the geographic distribution of clinics . . .
and Idaho’s abortion restrictions compound to make accessing care more difficult.”).
86
Cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious
Schools, 104 HARV. L. REV. 989, 1033 (1991) (“[I]f all hospitals were public, the ban on
abortions in public facilities would be equivalent to a direct prohibition of all abortions that
must be performed in a hospital.”).
87
See Webster, 492 U.S. at 509 (citing 448 U.S. at 315).
88
Harris, 448 U.S. at 311 (“[W]e must consider the constitutional validity of the Hyde
Amendment.”).
89
See id. at 301; see also Webster, 492 U.S. at 508 (noting that in Harris the Court upheld
a prohibition on federal funding of abortion except where the woman’s life would be endangered by carrying the pregnancy to term).
90
Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
91
Id.
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making it illegal to obtain one in the state, but was “merely” choosing not to remove
a burden (the woman’s poverty) that was itself not attributable to the state. Justice
O’Connor also believed that the state was not imposing an undue burden on abortion
“merely” by refraining from offering a subsidy and instead encouraging other kinds
of practices.92
The Harris Court’s (and Justice O’Connor’s) position on the constitutionality
of the Hyde Amendment should be placed in context. Suppose that a poor, pregnant
woman were to face severe, but non-life-threatening, medical complications if she
did not abort her pregnancy. The Hyde Amendment, upheld in Harris, prevents
federal funds from being used to pay for such an abortion, which would mean that
the woman might be forced to carry the pregnancy to term and would simply have
to hope that those complications did not occur.93 The Harris Court explained that the
Constitution “does not confer an entitlement to such funds as may be necessary to
realize all the advantages of that [reproductive] freedom.”94 Thus, the Harris Court
reasoned, the state does not unduly burden abortion rights by refusing to fund those
procedures, even if such a refusal might result in many women having severe,
irreversible health complications that might easily have been avoided.
By the same token, the Webster majority reasoned that the Constitution does not
require the state to provide abortions.95 Nor does the Constitution require Missouri
to open up its public hospitals so that private doctors could use those public facilities
to perform abortions.96 The Webster majority offered the consolation that “Missouri’s refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals
leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to
operate any public hospitals at all.”97
Suppose, instead, that a different right were at issue. Suppose that Missouri were
to bar public officials in public facilities from officiating at interracial marriage
ceremonies,98 denying that such a ban constituted an undue burden because such
92

See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 466 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
93
See Sandra Berenknopf, Comment, Judicial and Congressional Back-Door Methods
That Limit the Effect of Roe v. Wade: There Is No Choice If There Is No Access, 70 TEMP.
L. REV. 653, 660 (1997) (“The most serious problem with the Hyde Amendment, however,
is that it causes significant health risks to poor women who need Medicaid funding to have
an abortion.”).
94
Harris, 448 U.S. at 317–18.
95
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 (1989) (“Nothing in the Constitution requires States to enter or remain in the business of performing abortions.”).
96
Id. (“Nor . . . do private physicians and their patients have some kind of constitutional
right of access to public facilities for the performance of abortions.”).
97
Id. at 509.
98
Cf. David R. Upham, Interracial Marriage and the Original Understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 260 (2015) (discussing a state
judge “refusing a marriage license to an interracial couple, consistent with Nebraska’s law”).
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couples would have been in the same position if the state had decided to get out of the
marriage business.99 Presumably, the Court would have struck down the law barring
public officials from officiating at such marriages,100 even if the state could have
gotten out of the marriage business altogether.101 Once the state decides to operate
public hospitals, it is not given carte blanche with respect to how those facilities will be
used.102 While states may not be obligated to provide abortions,103 the Court’s rationale
about women being no worse off than they would have been had the State offered no
medical services was neither persuasive nor likely to promote confidence in the Court.
The Webster majority cautioned that “[a] different analysis might apply if a
particular State had socialized medicine and all of its hospitals and physicians were
publicly funded.”104 Yet, the majority did not explain why. Presumably, the explanation would have been that the state would then have barred private hospitals from
existing and so would have acted affirmatively to preclude abortion.105 But if that
is the correct understanding of Webster, then it was not the lack of access to abortion
per se that violated constitutional guarantees but rather the state having affirmatively
acted to bring about that lack of availability.
The Harris Court employed that same approach. The federal refusal to fund nonlife-threatening abortions was not viewed as affirmatively acting to limit abortion
99

Cf. George W. Dent Jr., Meaningless Marriage: The Incoherent Legacy of Obergefell
v. Hodges, 17 APPALACHIAN J.L. 1, 50, 57 (2018) (suggesting that “government [get] out of
‘the marriage business’”).
100
Compare Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964) (In response to conditions
in a Virginia county, the Court said that “[w]hatever nonracial grounds might support a State’s
allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and
grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.”), with Peter
Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s–1960s,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 392 (1994) (In 1705, “[t]he [Virginia] legislature set a fine of
10,000 pounds of tobacco for any preacher who officiated at a marriage between a white and
a nonwhite; half that amount would go to the colony and half to the informer.”).
101
Cf. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (1971) (“But the issue here is whether
black citizens in Jackson are being denied their constitutional rights when the city has closed
the public pools to black and white alike. Nothing in the history or the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment nor in any of our prior cases persuades us that the closing of the
Jackson swimming pools to all its citizens constitutes a denial of ‘the equal protection of the
laws.’”). But see Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense
of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1287–88, 98–99 (2015) (“The state cannot simply get out
of the marriage business.”).
102
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–70 (1977) (holding that the state’s operation of
medical care is subject to constitutional limitations).
103
See supra notes 95–96.
104
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 510 n.8 (1989).
105
The Webster majority reasoned, “This case might also be different if the State barred
doctors who performed abortions in private facilities from the use of public facilities for any
purpose.” See id. Here, too, the reasoning seems to be that the state would have acted in a
way to limit abortion access.

382

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:367

access but as “simply a refusal to subsidize certain protected conduct,”106 even
though the Hyde Amendment may have resulted in many women not having been
able to obtain abortions that otherwise would have been available.107
The Maher, Harris, and Webster opinions suggested that a state, while precluded
from prohibiting abortion, was not required to facilitate the procedure. Such a position
meant that many women as a practical matter might not have access to abortion,
which many, but not all, believed to be a substantial blow to abortion rights.108
Prior to Casey, the abortion rights jurisprudence was confused and confusing.
The Court neither offered a clear way to determine which conditions were unduly
burdensome nor a way to determine which unduly burdensome conditions were
attributable to the government. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey109 provided an opportunity to clarify the existing jurisprudence.
II. THE UNDUE BURDEN STANDARD UNDER CASEY AND SUBSEQUENT CASES
Casey is important both because of what it did not do and because of what it did.
Casey might have overruled Roe v. Wade,110 but did not do so.111 Further, Casey
announced the official standard for determining whether abortion regulations passed
muster—the undue burden standard112—and attempted to clarify how that standard
should be used.113 However, the clarification was much less helpful than it might
have been, making the standard no less difficult to apply.114
106

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980).
See id. at 338 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he predictable result of the Hyde Amendment will be a significant increase in the number of poor women who will die or suffer
significant health damage because of an inability to procure necessary medical services.”); cf.
Richard Vuernick, Comment, State Constitutions as a Source of Individual Liberties: Expanding
Protection for Abortion Funding Under Medicaid, 19 J.CONTEMP.L. 185, 195 (1993) (“Another
effect of Harris was to drastically reduce the number of federally funded abortions.”).
108
See James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, What Does Webster Mean?, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 157, 177 (1989) (“Webster has wrought a substantial de facto change in abortion law and
forecasts an express, formal reconsideration and overruling of Roe.”); Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 318 (1996) (“I argue that Webster was a
measured ruling in certain respects.”).
109
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
110
See id. at 873 (plurality opinion) (“We reject the trimester framework, which we do not
consider to be part of the essential holding of Roe.” (discussing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1972)); see also Linda J. Wharton & Kathryn Kolbert, Preserving Roe v. Wade . . . When
You Win Only Half the Loaf, 24 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 144 (2013) (discussing “the
expectations of most court watchers at the time, who fully believed that the [Casey] Court
was prepared to overrule Roe”).
111
Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (reaffirming “Roe’s essential holding”).
112
Id. at 876 (plurality opinion) (“In our view, the undue burden standard is the appropriate
means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected liberty.”).
113
See id. (“Because we set forth a standard of general application to which we intend to
adhere, it is important to clarify what is meant by an undue burden.”).
114
See id. at 877 (“A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a
107
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Casey involved the constitutionality of several provisions in a Pennsylvania statute:
The Act requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her
informed consent prior to the abortion procedure, and specifies
that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours
before the abortion is performed. For a minor to obtain an abortion, the Act requires the informed consent of one of her parents,
but provides for a judicial bypass option if the minor does not
wish to or cannot obtain a parent’s consent. Another provision
of the Act requires that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating
that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion.115
Writing for the majority—and, at times, pluralities—Justice O’Connor examined
the provisions, explaining why each passed or failed to pass constitutional muster.116
Regrettably, the analyses of the constitutionality of some of the provisions undercut
the articulated test, making its application even more difficult.
First, the majority articulated its three-part understanding of the essence of Roe:
1. The first part involved “a recognition of the right of the woman to choose
to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”117 Prior to the fetus’s “viability, the State’s interests
are not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right to elect
the procedure.”118
2. The second part discussed the limitations on the state’s power to regulate
abortions after the fetus had attained viability. The majority confirmed
“the State’s power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, if the law
contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life
or health.”119
3. The third part involved the recognition “that the State has legitimate
interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the
woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.”120
state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”).
115
Id. at 844 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
116
See generally id. at 879–901 (majority & plurality opinions).
117
Id. at 846 (majority opinion).
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
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The Court explained that although these principles differ in content, they “do
not contradict one another”121—they should be interpreted in a way that yields a coherent doctrine, which means that a particular approach may be rejected for failing to
take one of these into account.122 Nonetheless, many approaches would be consistent
with all three principles,123 some being much more protective of abortion rights than
others.124 As to whether a particular set of regulations passes muster, that determination
will be a product of “reasoned judgment . . . [whose] boundaries are not susceptible
of expression as a simple rule,”125 which means that a broad range of approaches
might be consistent with these principles.126
The majority offered a broad outline of the Constitution’s constraints upon the
states, noting that “viability marks the earliest point at which the State’s interest in
fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
abortions.”127 Yet, the Court was not thereby suggesting that the state is precluded
from regulating abortion prior to viability. On the contrary, some regulation of abortions prior to viability are permissible, notwithstanding that “[a]ll abortion regulations interfere to some degree with a woman’s ability to decide whether to terminate
her pregnancy.”128 Basically, the plurality rejected that “all governmental intrusion

121

Id.
For example, the state’s interest in fetal life even before viability has been reached
might require the Court to reassess some of its prior holdings. See id. at 873 (plurality opinion)
(“A logical reading of the central holding in Roe itself, and a necessary reconciliation of the
liberty of the woman and the interest of the State in promoting prenatal life, require, in our
view, that we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid prohibition on all previability
regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life.”).
123
See Erika Bachiochi, A Putative Right in Search of a Constitutional Justification:
Understanding Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s Equality Rationale and How It Undermines
Women’s Equality, 35 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 593, 606 (2017) (discussing “a better balance of
these principles”); cf. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review:
A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV.
1269, 1271 (1997) (noting “that many provisions of the Constitution are written in broad and
abstract language, permitting many different plausible interpretations”).
124
See Chris Whitman, Looking Back on Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 100 MICH. L. REV.
1980, 1985 (2002) (“Casey . . . marked the outer boundaries of a compromise that will protect
women only from the most overwhelming and total coercion.”).
125
Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
126
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Abortion, the Undue Burden Standard, and the Evisceration
of Women’s Privacy, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 291, 292 (2010) (“The Casey standard
is amorphous enough to allow a wide range of respect for women’s privacy.”); Krissa Webb,
Note, Gender Mis-Conception: The Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act as a Remix of the
Abortion Debate, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257, 268 (2013) (“Casey can be a tool for those
who prefer more or less abortion regulation.”).
127
Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
128
Id. at 875 (plurality opinion).
122

2020]

UNDULY BURDENING ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

385

is of necessity unwarranted.”129 For example, the state is permitted to require that
abortions be performed under sanitary conditions.130
In some ways, Casey promised a new beginning in abortion jurisprudence.131
The plurality recognized that “[t]he concept of an undue burden has been utilized
by the Court as well as individual Members of the Court . . . in ways that could be
considered inconsistent,”132 which necessitated “clarify[ing] what is meant by an
undue burden.”133 The plurality explained that “[a] finding of an undue burden is a
shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable
fetus.”134 In the past, members of the Court had disagreed about whether a finding
of an undue burden was simply a trigger for closer scrutiny or, instead, an indication
that the regulation at issue violated constitutional guarantees,135 and the Casey
plurality took a position on that point of disagreement.
When pointing out that a regulation might impose an undue burden by virtue of
its purpose or effect,136 the plurality was discussing two different reasons that a
regulation might be found impermissible. A statute with “the purpose . . . of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking” to abort her not-yet-viable
fetus “is invalid because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in
potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”137
A statute with “the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s
choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”138
Thus, a statute with such a purpose or effect would not merely trigger closer scrutiny but would be unconstitutional.139 Further, lest there be any doubt about whether
129

Id.
See Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Chicago Bd. of Health, 505 F.2d 1141, 1154 (7th Cir.
1974) (noting that “general requirements as to the maintaining of sanitary facilities and
general requirements as to meeting minimal building code standards would be permissible”).
131
See Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 248 (2009) (“Casey dramatically changed the
landscape of abortion law and set forth the basic test for abortion regulation that is still the
law today . . . .”); see also Claire O’Brien, Casey, Camnitz, and Compelled Speech: Why the
Fourth Circuit’s Interpretation of Casey Sets the Right Standard for Speech-and-Display
Provisions, 94 N.C.L.REV. 1036, 1044 (2016) (“Although the Casey Court nominally affirmed
the right to an abortion first recognized in Roe v. Wade, it introduced a new test for assessing
state regulations on access to abortion: the undue burden test.”).
132
Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (plurality opinion).
133
Id.
134
Id. at 877.
135
See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.
136
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion).
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard: Orienting
Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2025, 2036 (1994) (“But the
130
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the announced standard superseded past usages of the undue burden test, the plurality
explained that, “[t]o the extent that the opinions of the Court or of individual Justices
use the undue burden standard in a manner that is inconsistent with this analysis, [this
is] . . . the controlling standard.”140
In applying the newly announced standard, the plurality seemed to ignore the very
test that had been adopted. For example, the plurality reasoned, “Unless it has that
effect”—imposing a substantial obstacle—“on her right of choice, a state measure
designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over abortion will be upheld if reasonably
related to that goal.”141 Yet, regulations adopted with the purpose or effect (rather than
purpose and effect) of placing a substantial obstacle in a woman’s path are unconstitutional. If that is so, then regulations with such a purpose are unconstitutional,142
even if those regulations do not in fact have that effect. If, instead, a measure with
the purpose of hindering the exercise of abortion rights must in addition place a
substantial obstacle on their exercise, then the purpose prong does no work.143
After announcing the purpose prong and then gutting it,144 the plurality discussed the effect prong, noting that “[r]egulations designed to foster the health of
a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.”145
Such a standard requires guidance with respect to the point at which health regulations impose a “substantial obstacle,”146 and the previous jurisprudence already
suggests how elastic a concept that is.147
Casey undue burden standard differs significantly from the version O’Connor developed in
Akron I. Her earlier formulation defined an undue burden as an ‘absolute obstacle[] or severe
limitation[]’ and did not inquire into the purpose of a regulation until after the existence of
such a burden had been proven. Moreover, the question of whether an undue burden existed
was only a threshold inquiry; after finding an undue burden, O’Connor then applied strict
scrutiny to determine whether the undue burden was justified.”).
140
Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion).
141
Id. at 877–78.
142
But see Jenny K. Jarrard, Note, The Failed Purpose Prong: Women’s Right to Choose
in Theory, Not in Fact, Under the Undue Burden Standard, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 469,
501 (2014) (noting that “Casey devoted little attention to the purpose prong”).
143
The plurality suggested that a regulation imposing a substantial obstacle on a woman
exercising her right to abortion would itself violate constitutional guarantees, see Casey, 505
U.S. at 877 (plurality opinion) (“[A]n undue burden is an unconstitutional burden.”), so a
regulation with that effect would be struck whether or not it had the purpose to do so. Cf.
Thomas B. Colby, The Other Half of the Abortion Right, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1043, 1047
(2018) (“The vast majority of the cases applying Casey’s undue burden test ignore the
purpose prong altogether, and analyze the law solely through the lens of effect.”).
144
Id. at 1047–48 (“The Casey plurality announced the purpose prong, but . . . it did not even
bother to seriously apply the purpose prong to the Pennsylvania statute at issue in the case—
instead deciding the case solely on effects grounds, even while upholding most of the law.”).
145
Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion).
146
Id. at 877.
147
See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text (discussing whether the Akron hospital
stay requirement constituted an undue burden).
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The plurality considered the challenge to Pennsylvania’s informed consent
provision, which included “the provision of specific information by the doctor and
the mandatory 24-hour waiting period.”148 The state required that the pregnant
woman be informed “of the availability of printed materials published by the State
describing the fetus and providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the father, and a list of agencies which
provide adoption and other services as alternatives to abortion.”149 Abortions were
prohibited absent the woman’s written certification that she had been informed of
the availability of the relevant information and that she had received the information
if requested.150
The plurality “s[aw] no reason why the State may not require doctors to inform
a woman seeking an abortion of the availability of materials relating to the consequences to the fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her
health.”151 The requirement that “the woman be informed of the availability of
information relating to fetal development and the assistance available should she
decide to carry the pregnancy to full term [helps] ensure an informed choice, one
which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”152 Might some
women who chose to receive that information be persuaded to continue their pregnancies? Perhaps. Such a requirement allegedly furthered the state’s “legitimate goal
of protecting the life of the unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a
decision that is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a
preference for childbirth over abortion.”153 Of course, in the interest of full and
informed decision-making, one might have expected the state to require that the
comparative morbidity and mortality rates of abortion and childbirth also be offered,
which might have resulted in somewhat different decision-making.154
Suppose that the state was imposing the informed decision-making requirement
precisely because it wanted to deter women from having abortions.155 The state’s
148

Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
Id.; see also Jeffrey Roseberry, Comment, Undue Burden and the Law of Abortion in
Arizona, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 411 (2012) (“In Casey, the statute required the availability
of printed information regarding the development of the fetus be made available to the
woman, but not explicitly exposed to her.”).
150
Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
151
Id. at 882.
152
Id. at 883.
153
Id.
154
See Amanda Warford, Note, The Intersection of Kentucky’s Abortion Parental-Consent
Bypass Law and Mandatory Child-Abuse Reporting Statute: A Judicial Dilemma and Proposed
Legislative Solution, 50 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177, 192 (2011) (“[M]edical risks associated
with abortion are admittedly not as high as that of childbirth.”).
155
Cf. Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 85
(1995) (“The statute also required the disclosure of nonmedically related economic information geared to deter abortions based purely on financial reasons.”).
149
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doing so would seem to violate the purpose prong of the undue burden test, so it is
difficult to understand the plurality’s conclusion that “[t]his requirement cannot be
considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is
no undue burden.”156
The plurality’s discussion of the twenty-four-hour waiting period was even more
disappointing. The district court had found that “because of the distances many
women must travel to reach an abortion provider, the practical effect will often be
a delay of much more than a day because the waiting period requires that a woman
seeking an abortion make at least two visits to the doctor.”157 That court had concluded that the regulations would be “‘particularly burdensome’ [to] those women
who have the fewest financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and
those who have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or
others.”158 However, because the district court had used the prevailing legal standard
to strike down the requirement159 rather than the undue burden test announced after
the district court had issued its decision, the plurality concluded that the requirement
did not offend the undue burden test rather than remand the case to see if the
particularly burdensome requirement was unduly burdensome.160
The plurality’s reasoning did not inspire confidence that the undue burden test
was being applied in good faith. The plurality rejected “the District Court’s conclusion that the ‘particularly burdensome’ effects of the waiting period on some women
require its invalidation” because “a particular burden is not of necessity a substantial
obstacle.”161 Yet, the description of something as “particularly burdensome” is not
the equivalent of mentioning “a particular burden.” A particular burden might not
be very burdensome at all, much less particularly burdensome.
The plurality offered a different reason that the twenty-four-hour waiting period
was not unduly burdensome: “The idea that important decisions will be more informed
and deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs that important information become
part of the background of the decision.”162 Here, the plurality was suggesting that
156

Casey, 505 U.S. at 883 (plurality opinion).
Id. at 885–86.
158
Id. at 886 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1352
(E.D. Pa. 1990)).
159
Id. (“[A]pplying the trimester framework’s strict prohibition of all regulation designed
to promote the State’s interest in potential life before viability the District Court concluded
that the waiting period does not further the state ‘interest in maternal health’ and ‘infringes
the physician’s discretion to exercise sound medical judgment.’” (quoting Casey, 744 F.
Supp. at 1378)).
160
Id.; see also Lauren Paulk, What Is an “Undue Burden”? The Casey Standard as
Applied to Informed Consent Provisions, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 71, 79 (2013) (“Rather than
remanding the case for a new ruling . . . , the plurality used the fact that the District Court
failed to apply [the undue burden] test . . . as a reason to uphold the 24-hour waiting period.”).
161
Casey, 505 U.S. at 886–87 (plurality opinion).
162
Id. at 885.
157
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where someone receives new information, the state acts reasonably when requiring
that the person have time to mull it over.163 But the plurality’s interpretation of the
Pennsylvania provision was that as a general matter the information had to be made
available twenty-four hours before the abortion.164
Suppose that the information were made available to a patient who politely
declined. The statute still required enforcement of the waiting period, even though
there was no additional information for the patient to mull over.165 For those not
asking for additional information for whom the requirement was particularly burdensome, it is difficult to conceive how the unduly burdensome test had not been met.166
Nonetheless, the plurality concluded that “[i]n theory, at least, the waiting period is
a reasonable measure to implement the State’s interest in protecting the life of the
unborn, a measure that does not amount to an undue burden.”167
The plurality struck down the spousal notification requirement because enforcing it would likely result in increased domestic violence.168 The requirement did “not
merely make abortions a little more difficult or expensive to obtain; for many
women, it . . . impose[d] a substantial obstacle.”169
Suppose, however, that those defending the law were correct that the spousal notification requirement would be burdensome for only one percent of the women.170
Even so, the requirement violated constitutional guarantees: “The analysis does not
end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there.
Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on those
whose conduct it affects.”171
163

See C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe’d to Confusion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
30 HOUS. L. REV. 1457, 1495 (1993) (“[T]he plurality upheld a twenty-four hour waiting
period provision because it was not unreasonable to assume that a woman’s abortion decision
would be more informed and deliberate if it followed some period of reflection.”).
164
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion).
165
See Susannah Iles, Note, Prescription Restriction: Why Birth Control Must Be Overthe-Counter in the United States, 26 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389, 415 (2019) (“Casey involved
a Pennsylvania law that, in part, required informed consent and a 24-hour waiting period for
all women seeking to receive an abortion . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also Casey, 505 U.S.
at 921 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A] rigid requirement that all
patients wait 24 hours or (what is true in practice) much longer to evaluate the significance
of information that is either common knowledge or irrelevant is an irrational and, therefore,
‘undue’ burden.”).
166
Cf. Robert D. Goldstein, Reading Casey: Structuring the Woman’s Decisionmaking
Process, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 787, 828 (1996) (“For those who decline to receive the
state’s message, the delay caused by a forced second visit is completely irrational.”).
167
Casey, 505 U.S. at 885 (plurality opinion).
168
See id. at 893 (majority opinion).
169
Id. at 893–94.
170
See id. at 894 (“[R]espondents argue [that] the effects of § 3209 are felt by only one
percent of the women who obtain abortions.”).
171
Id.
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The majority’s point is well taken. Even if relatively few individuals marry outside
of their race,172 that would not somehow justify upholding the constitutionality of
interracial marriage bans. Yet, the plurality’s reasoning would also suggest that the
particularly burdensome waiting period for at least some women would have been
unduly burdensome173 and hence unconstitutional.174
A separate question is whether the plurality even considered the difficult linedrawing problem suggested by Maher.175 Suppose that requiring spousal notification
would result in more domestic abuse or, perhaps, in more women not even seeking
to obtain abortions precisely because they feared domestic abuse would result from
fulfilling the notification requirement. The question would be whether the abuse (or
threat of abuse) would constitute an undue burden attributable to the state (because
the state had imposed the spousal notification requirement) or instead attributable
to a private party (the abusive husband) rather than the state. If the new standard
adopted in Casey does not take into account whether the undue burden is attributable
to a private party rather than the state because, after all, the state will have done
something resulting in some women having great difficulty in obtaining abortions,
then there may be important implications for past decisions. Consider, for example,
a state singling out therapeutic abortions as the only necessary medical procedure that
the state would refuse to subsidize. Such a policy would likely result in many women
being unable to obtain abortions whether or not the state was responsible for the
poverty, putting non-subsidized abortions out of reach. But if the fact that the husband
rather than the state would be responsible for any spousal abuse would nonetheless
not immunize the spousal notification requirement from constitutional invalidation,
then the fact that the state was not responsible for the women’s poverty176 would not
172
Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Essay, Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 891 n.98
(2006) (“[I]nterracial marriages of any kind constitute a minuscule percentage of the married
population, making up approximately 0.6% of all marriages.”).
173
See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text; see also Paulk, supra note 160, at
79–80 (“Had the Casey court applied the large fraction test in a manner similar to the way
it applied the test to the husband notification provision, the decision may have read, ‘it is
common sense to assume that cost would apply as a restriction amounting to a substantial
obstacle for a large fraction of the women for whom cost is a concern.’”).
174
See Khiara M. Bridges, “Life” in the Balance: Judicial Review of Abortion Regulations,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285, 1303–04 (2013) (“[T]his is a Court that is blind to the fact that
there is ‘another world out there’ in which the increase in costs occasioned by a twenty-four
hour waiting period are experienced not as ‘slight,’ but rather as tragic.”). Some commentators
seem not to appreciate the Court’s continued unwillingness to apply the undue burden standard
in a way that would secure abortion rights for the indigent. See Alyssa Engstrom, Note, The
Hyde Amendment: Perpetuating Injustice and Discrimination After Thirty-Nine Years, 25 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 451, 474 (2016) (“[T]he Hyde Amendment is inconsistent with the
precedent established by Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, which prohibits the
government from establishing an ‘undue burden’ in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,
a standard that is almost certainly met here by indigent women seeking an abortion.”).
175
See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
176
But see Rhonda Copelon, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and

2020]

UNDULY BURDENING ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

391

immunize from constitutional invalidation a law putting abortion out of the reach
of many women, which would mean that Harris177 might require reconsideration.
The point about Harris might be generalized. In some ways, Casey was offering
a new abortion jurisprudence.178 But if that is so, then one would not expect that past
precedent would determine whether a particular practice was constitutional,179
because the new test might yield a different conclusion than the previous test had
yielded.180 If it were clear that Casey imposed a less demanding standard than had
previously existed in all cases and that the former standard had been applied properly, then whatever regulations had been upheld earlier would of course be upheld
under the less demanding standard. But the Casey standard was preserving the
essential holding of Roe,181 so the standard was presumably not weaker in all cases.
Further, a separate question was whether Roe had always been properly applied. If
Roe had been misapplied when upholding certain practices,182 then past precedent
Reproductive Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 15, 47 (1991) (“To treat a poor
woman’s restricted choice as a consequence of her own personal failure, rather than of public
policy and resulting market conditions, is a dangerous fiction. It permits the state to escape
responsibility for the tragic conditions of people’s lives and allows it to blame the poor, who
are largely women, for their hardship.”).
177
See supra notes 87–94 and accompanying text.
178
See supra notes 131–40 and accompanying text.
179
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) (plurality opinion)
(“Under these precedents, in our view, the one-parent consent requirement and judicial bypass
procedure are constitutional.”).
180
For example, Casey overruled some past precedents:
To the extent [City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416 (1983)] and [Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986)] find a constitutional violation when
the government requires, as it does here, the giving of truthful, nonmisleading information about the nature of the procedure, the attendant
health risks and those of childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age’ of
the fetus, those cases go too far, are inconsistent with Roe’s acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life, and are overruled.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
181
See id. at 846 (majority opinion) (discussing “Roe’s essential holding, the holding we
reaffirm”).
182
See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 483 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“None can
take seriously the Court’s assurance that its ‘conclusion signals no retreat from Roe [v. Wade]
or the cases applying it.’” (alteration in original)); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I write separately to express my continuing disagreement
with the Court’s mischaracterization of the nature of the fundamental right recognized in Roe
v. Wade, and its misconception of the manner in which that right is infringed by federal and
state legislation withdrawing all funding for medically necessary abortions.” (citation omitted));
Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The simple truth is that Roe would not survive the plurality’s analysis,
and that the plurality provides no substitute for Roe’s protective umbrella.”); see also Teresa
L. Scott, Note, Burying the Dead: The Case Against Revival of Pre-Roe and Pre-Casey
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should certainly not be viewed as dispositive when attempting to apply the new
undue burden test.
III. THE POST-CASEY UNDUE BURDEN JURISPRUDENCE
The undue burden jurisprudence after Casey reflects some of the ambiguities
and uncertainties that were in Casey itself. For example, in Mazurek v. Armstrong,
the Court examined a Montana regulation precluding non-physicians from performing abortions.183 The Court noted that Casey had upheld a Pennsylvania provision
precluding non-physicians from giving abortion information to women because
there had been a lack of evidence that such a restriction posed a substantial obstacle
to women seeking an abortion.184 But the fact that Casey had upheld a physiciansonly requirement under the undue burden effects prong would not negate the force
of the instant challenge where the basis for enjoining enforcement of the requirement was improper purpose.185 Even had the Casey challenge been analyzed under
the purpose prong,186 a challenge based on purpose might be rejected in one case and
upheld in another, precisely because the evidence was stronger in the latter case that
the purpose had been invidious.187
The Mazurek Court was unwilling to say that improper purpose alone would
suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of the statute.188 Instead of citing Casey
for the proposition that an improper purpose would invalidate an abortion regulation,189 the Mazurek Court offered its analysis “even assuming the correctness of the
Abortion Statutes in a Post-Casey World, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 355, 361
(1992) (“Previous decisions had weakened Roe . . . .”).
183
520 U.S. 968, 969 (1997) (per curiam) (“In 1995, the Montana Legislature enacted a
statute restricting the performance of abortions to licensed physicians.”).
184
See id. at 971 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 884–85 (plurality opinion)).
185
See id. at 972.
186
A separate issue is whether the purpose prong does any work. See supra notes 141–43
and accompanying text.
187
See Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959) (noting
that a literacy test might be unconstitutional in one case and not the other because in the
former the purpose was clearly invidiously discriminatory whereas in the latter the purpose
was not clearly invidiously discriminatory).
188
See Linda J. Wharton et al., Preserving the Core of Roe: Reflections on Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 344 (2006) (“[T]he [Mazurek] Court
flirted with the suggestion that an unconstitutional purpose standing alone would not suffice
to invalidate an abortion restriction.”); see also David L. Rosenthal, Refocusing the Undue
Burden Test: Inconsistent Interpretations Pose A Substantial Obstacle to Constitutional
Legislation, 31 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 22 (2016) (discussing “the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Mazurek v. Armstrong, which held that an impermissible purpose will only be found if the
law succeeds in achieving an impermissible effect; therefore, there need not be an analysis
of the legislative purpose before examining the effect of the law”).
189
See supra note 134 and accompanying text (noting that under Casey a regulation can
be invalidated because of its purpose or effect).
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Court of Appeals’ implicit premise—that a legislative purpose to interfere with the
constitutionally protected right to abortion without the effect of interfering with that
right . . . could render the Montana law invalid,”190 as if the Court of Appeals was
proposing something ridiculous. The Mazurek Court then noted that there was no
smoking gun to indicate invidious purpose,191 rejecting as insufficient the point that
“‘all health evidence contradicts the claim that there is any health basis’ for the law.”192
After all, Casey had emphasized “that the Constitution gives the States broad latitude
to decide that particular functions may be performed only by licensed professionals,
even if an objective assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be
performed by others.”193
Yet, a classification that is objectively underinclusive would at least be a candidate
for being struck down as offending constitutional guarantees because it is irrational
or invidiously motivated.194 Further, if a requirement for establishing invidious intent
is that a member of the legislature or council expressly articulate improper purpose,
then many invidious actions will go unpunished as long as council members and
legislators can restrain themselves from making invidious comments.195
It may be that the Montana Legislature was not aiming to substantially burden
abortion rights but was instead targeting one particular individual.196 Nonetheless,
the difficulty in both Mazurek and Casey is that if invidious purpose is a basis upon
which to strike down an abortion regulation, but one cannot establish invidious
purpose by objectively establishing that the regulation does not promote the claimed
190

Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972.
Id. (“One searches the Court of Appeals’ opinion in vain for any mention of any
evidence suggesting an unlawful motive on the part of the Montana Legislature.”).
192
Id. at 973 (quoting Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 7, id. (No. 96-1104)).
193
Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885 (1992) (plurality
opinion)).
194
See id.; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985)
(“The State may not rely on a classification whose relationship to an asserted goal is so
attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.”) (first citing Zobel v. Williams,
457 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1982); and then citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,
535 (1973)); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 245 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“The Equal
Protection Clause protects against arbitrary and irrational classifications, and against invidious discrimination stemming from prejudice and hostility . . . .”).
195
The Court has already suggested that the refusal to consider anything other than direct
evidence such as express discriminatory states would exclude too much. See Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”).
196
Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 978 (“The record strongly indicates that the physician assistant
provision was aimed at excluding one specific person—respondent Cahill—from the category
of persons who could perform abortions.”); see also Roseberry, supra note 149, at 395
(“[B]ecause only one abortion provider was affected it was unlikely ‘the legislature intended
the law to do what it plainly did not do,’ create an undue burden.” (quoting Mazurek, 520
U.S. at 973–74)).
191
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goals, then the purpose prong is a prong in name only. In the past, the Court has been
willing to require that state regulations be reasonably related to asserted goals,197 so
the deference suggested in Casey and Mazurek undermines confidence in the Court’s
commitment to protecting abortion rights.
In Stenberg v. Carhart198 and Gonzales v. Carhart,199 the Court examined two
statutes criminalizing partial birth abortions. Stenberg involved a Nebraska statute
that applied to abortions of both pre-viable and viable fetuses.200 The Stenberg Court
struck down the statute both because it did not pass the undue burden test insofar as
it regulated abortions of previable fetuses201 and because significant medical authority suggested that the health of certain women would be put at risk if the procedure
at issue were proscribed, which meant that the statute could not pass muster even
insofar as it regulated abortions of viable fetuses.202 The Stenberg Court explained
that it was not relevant that many women would not incur increased health risks if
the procedure were banned: “[T]he State cannot prohibit a person from obtaining
treatment simply by pointing out that most people do not need it.”203
In contrast, the Gonzales Court held that the federal law banning partial birth
abortion was constitutional, notwithstanding that the law limited abortions of both
previable and viable fetuses.204 While significant authority suggested that women’s
health would thereby be put at risk, others had testified that the ban would not put
women’s health at risk.205 The Court explained that “state and federal legislatures
[are given] wide discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and
scientific uncertainty.”206 But if all that is needed to establish medical and scientific
197

See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 434 (1983)
(“[T]he State is obligated to make a reasonable effort to limit the effect of its regulations to
the period in the trimester during which its health interest will be furthered.”).
198
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
199
550 U.S. 124 (2007).
200
Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (“Nebraska’s law applies both previability and postviability
. . . .”).
201
See id. at 948 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Nebraska’s statute is unconstitutional on
the alternative and independent ground that it imposes an undue burden on a woman’s right
to choose to terminate her pregnancy before viability.”).
202
See id. at 931 (majority opinion) (“Our cases have repeatedly invalidated statutes that
in the process of regulating the methods of abortion, imposed significant health risks.”); id. at
932 (“[T]he record shows that significant medical authority supports the proposition that in
some circumstances, D&X would be the safest procedure.”); id. at 947 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]he Nebraska statute is inconsistent with Casey because it lacks an exception for
those instances when the banned procedure is necessary to preserve the health of the mother.”).
203
Id. at 934 (majority opinion).
204
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147 (“The Act does apply both previability and postviability
. . . .”).
205
Id. at 161 (“[W]hether the Act creates significant health risks for women has been a
contested factual question. The evidence presented in the trial courts and before Congress
demonstrates both sides have medical support for their position.”).
206
Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
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uncertainty is a lack of unanimity, then there will be medical uncertainty about
almost everything,207 which means that Gonzales requires deference to the legislature about virtually any health-related regulation.208
In addition, the Gonzales Court justified upholding the constitutionality of the
statute by noting that the “respondents have not demonstrated that the Act would be
unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant cases.”209 After all, “the statute . . .
applies to all instances in which the doctor proposes to use the prohibited procedure,
not merely those in which the woman suffers from medical complications.”210
Yet, the same analysis would have resulted in the spousal notification requirement being upheld in Casey. The notification requirement was not only applicable
to women who might be abused and “impose[d] almost no burden at all for the vast
majority of women seeking abortions,”211 so the Gonzales reasoning suggests that
the Casey regulation would not have been “unconstitutional in a large fraction of
relevant cases.”212
The Stenberg Court noted that “the State cannot prohibit a person from obtaining treatment simply by pointing out that most people do not need it,”213 and the
Casey majority had explained that “[t]he analysis does not end with the one percent
of women upon whom the statute operates; it begins there.”214 The Gonzales Court’s
analysis of why the statute at issue would not be unconstitutional in a large fraction
of cases defined the “relevant cases” incorrectly, ignoring the Casey admonition that
“[l]egislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on
those whose conduct it affects.”215
207

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[I]t would be
unreasonable to conclude that the subject of scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably, there are no certainties in science.”); see also McKay v. State, 235 S.W.2d
173, 174 (Tex. Crim. App. 1950) (“This Court may recognize generally accepted scientific
conclusions, even though there should be some who disagree with them. In all probability
a scientist may be found who will disagree with practically every generally accepted scientific
theory.”); Mary Ziegler, Facing Facts: The New Era of Abortion Conflict After Whole
Woman’s Health, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1231, 1277 (2017) (“Requiring definitive proof
is a clever way of justifying almost any abortion restriction, particularly since reaching the
point of absolute scientific certainty will likely be impossible.”).
208
Cf. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 462 (1983)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[T]he regulation has a ‘rational relation’ to a valid state objective
of ensuring the health and welfare of its citizens.” (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 491 (1955))).
209
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167–68 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 895 (1992)).
210
Id. at 168.
211
Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
212
Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167–68.
213
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 934 (2000).
214
Casey, 505 U.S. at 894.
215
Id.
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Gonzales could be read in numerous ways. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in
dissent, the federal law was being upheld, notwithstanding the law lacking a health
exception216 and the law applying to abortions of previable as well as viable fetuses.217
If, indeed, the Court was upholding a statute that imposed an undue burden on previability abortions, then the Court would have been rejecting Casey.218 Or, Gonzales
might be read as rejecting the premise that banning one abortion procedure imposed
an undue burden on abortion rights219 and as rejecting that an exemption was required
to protect women’s health,220 notwithstanding testimony that the banned procedure
was “significantly safer for women with certain pregnancy-related conditions, such
as placenta previa and accreta, and for women carrying fetuses with certain abnormalities, such as severe hydrocephalus.”221 If banning one abortion method is not
particularly significant and not unduly burdensome,222 then Gonzales might not be
thought a particularly worrisome development insofar as the general jurisprudence
is concerned.223
Whether Gonzales represents a turning point that might eventually result in
overturning Roe and Casey224 or, instead, an application of Casey with no significant
implications for the evolving jurisprudence225 is an open question. Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt offered a partial answer.226 At issue were two Texas requirements:
216

Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[F]or the first time since Roe,
the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.”).
217
Id. (“It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability
abortions.”).
218
See id. at 170–71 (“Today’s decision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and Stenberg
seriously. It tolerates, indeed applauds, federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure
found necessary and proper in certain cases by the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists (ACOG).”).
219
Id. at 164 (majority opinion) (“The medical uncertainty over whether the Act’s prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to conclude in this facial
attack that the Act does not impose an undue burden.”).
220
See id. at 166–67 (“The Act is not invalid on its face where there is uncertainty over
whether the barred procedure is ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health, given the
availability of other abortion procedures that are considered to be safe alternatives.”).
221
Id. at 177–78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222
See Webb, supra note 126, at 268 (“[T]he Court found that the law did not impose a
substantial obstacle on the woman obtaining an abortion.”).
223
But see Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 170 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is
alarming.”).
224
Bernice Bird, Fetal Personhood Laws as Limits to Maternal Personhood at Any Stage
of Pregnancy: Balancing Fetal and Maternal Interests at Post-Viability Among Fetal Pain
and Fetal Homicide Laws, 25 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 46 (2014) (noting that in certain
respects Gonzales was “contrary to Roe and Casey”).
225
See Barry P. McDonald, A Hellerstedt Tale: There and Back Again?, 85 U. CIN. L.
REV. 979, 995–96 (2018) (suggesting that Gonzales is quite compatible with Casey).
226
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
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1. Physicians performing or inducing abortions had to have admitting
privileges at hospitals within thirty miles of where the abortions took
place;227 and
2. The minimum standards for abortion facilities were the equivalent of
the minimum standards for ambulatory surgical centers.228
The Hellerstedt Court reasoned that the purpose behind the admitting privileges
requirement was “to help ensure that women have easy access to a hospital should
complications arise during an abortion procedure.”229 However, because “abortion
in Texas was extremely safe,”230 the admitting privileges requirement was neither
necessary nor even helpful.231 Further, given that enforcement of the admitting privileges requirement resulted in half of the clinics closing, the Court concluded that
such a requirement imposed an undue burden.232
The Hellerstedt Court also considered the requirement that abortion facilities
meet the same standards as ambulatory surgical centers.233 The district court had found
that “the statutory provision requiring all abortion facilities to meet all surgicalcenter standards does not benefit patients and is not necessary,”234 and that enforcement of such a requirement “places a substantial obstacle in the path of women
seeking an abortion.”235
In addition to the district court finding that the ambulatory center requirement
would not benefit patients and was unnecessary, the Hellerstedt Court noted that the
surgical ambulatory center requirement was imposed on abortion facilities but not
on other non-surgical centers with less impressive safety records: “[A]bortions taking
place in an abortion facility are safe—indeed, safer than numerous procedures that take
place outside hospitals and to which Texas does not apply its surgical-center requirements.”236 The selective imposition of the requirement, especially where neither
227

Id. at 2300.
Id.
229
Id. at 2311.
230
Id.
231
See id. (“[T]here was no significant health-related problem that the new law helped to
cure.”).
232
Id. at 2312 (“[A]s of the time the admitting-privileges requirement began to be enforced,
the number of facilities providing abortions dropped in half, from about 40 to about 20.”);
see also id. (“[T]he record evidence indicates that the admitting-privileges requirement places
a ‘substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (plurality opinion))).
233
Id. at 2314.
234
Id. at 2315; see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 684 (W.D.
Tex. 2014) (“[W]omen will not obtain better care or experience more frequent positive
outcomes at an ambulatory surgical center as compared to a previously licensed facility.”).
235
Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2316.
236
Id. at 2315.
228
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necessary nor beneficial, at least suggested that a purpose behind the adoption of the
requirement was to hinder access to abortion, although the Hellerstedt Court did not
invalidate the restriction under the Casey purpose prong.237 Instead, the Court
“conclude[d] that neither of these provisions confer[red] medical benefits sufficient
to justify the burdens upon access that each imposes,” because “[e]ach place[d] a
substantial obstacle in the path of women seeking a previability abortion . . . [and]
constitute[d] an undue burden on abortion access.”238 One reason that these two
provisions imposed an undue burden on abortion rights was that enforcement of the
provisions would cause the number of abortion providers to decrease from forty to
seven or eight,239 and such a small number of providers would not be able to meet
the state’s needs.240
The Fifth Circuit had upheld both provisions, reasoning that they “‘were
rationally related to a legitimate state interest,’ namely, ‘rais[ing] the standard and
quality of care for women seeking abortions and . . . protect[ing] the health and
welfare of women seeking abortions.’”241 But the Supreme Court disagreed with that
analysis, at least in part, because the Court rejected that “legislatures, and not courts,
must resolve questions of medical uncertainty,” which the Court claimed was
“inconsistent with this Court’s case law.”242 The Court cited Gonzales in support,
notwithstanding the Gonzales Court’s “pointing out that [the Court] must review
legislative ‘factfinding under a deferential standard.’”243
The Hellerstedt decision is open to several different interpretations depending
upon which features of the case are emphasized.244 For example, upholding the
Texas laws would have resulted in eighty percent of abortion providers ceasing to
provide services, which would have had a huge impact on the availability of abortion providers.245 But the Court invalidating laws resulting in such a significant
reduction in the number of providers might not be thought particularly relevant in
237

See Colby, supra note 143, at 1047 (“[T]he Court then went on to analyze only whether
the law had the effect of imposing an undue burden, ultimately striking the law down on that
ground alone, notwithstanding the considerable evidence of a purpose to restrict abortion
rights.”).
238
See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (plurality opinion)).
239
See id. at 2301, 2316 (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673,
681–82 (W.D. Tex. 2014)).
240
See id. at 2316.
241
Id. at 2303 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 584 (5th Cir. 2015)).
242
Id. at 2310.
243
Id. (quoting Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165 (2007)).
244
See Ziegler, supra note 207, at 1231 (“Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt has
introduced unprecedented uncertainty into abortion jurisprudence.”).
245
See Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2317–18 (“[R]equiring seven or eight clinics to serve five
times their usual number of patients does indeed represent an undue burden on abortion
access.”).
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a different case where the challenged abortion statute did not have as drastic an
effect, which would mean that Hellerstedt should not be read as affirming robust
protection for abortion rights.246 Or, because the Court was unwilling to uphold
restrictive abortion legislation where other medical procedures with worse outcomes
were not subject to similarly restrictive legislation, perhaps Hellerstedt is reinstating
robust protection for abortion rights.247 Rather than provide some guidance about
how to read Hellerstedt or even Casey, June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo248
created even more disarray in abortion jurisprudence.
At issue was a Louisiana law requiring a physician to have admitting privileges
within thirty miles of the clinic where he or she performed abortions.249 The law was
challenged because it allegedly imposed an undue burden on the right to obtain an
abortion.250 The district court struck down the statute in light of Hellerstedt.251 At the
time of trial there were five abortion clinics in the state, but two had subsequently
ceased operation.252 Five doctors provided all abortions in the state.253 Several of the

246

See Mary Ziegler, After Life: Governmental Interests and the New Antiabortion Incrementalism, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 78, 79 (2018) (“[T]he Court’s recent decision in Whole
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt is part of the story of an equally important tactic used by
those chipping away at abortion rights . . . .”); Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole
Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 78
(“Whole Woman’s Health could provide far less reliable protection for abortion rights than might
appear, especially when one considers the strategies that abortion opponents have used.”).
247
See Maxwell L. Stearns, Obergefell, Fisher, and the Inversion of Tiers, 19 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1043, 1050 n.26 (2017) (describing the Hellerstedt Court as having “applied a more
stringent version of the undue burden test to strike down two provisions of a Texas law that
limited access to abortions by requiring physician-admitting privileges at local hospitals and
by restricting abortions to facilities upgraded to match those of a surgical center”); Paula
Walter, Hellerstedt—2016—How the United States Supreme Court Aborted the Texas Abortion
Statute, 12 J. HEALTH & BIOMED. L. 233, 271 (2017) (“Hellerstedt effectively put ‘judicial
teeth’ into the Casey undue burden test when it demanded that a restrictive abortion statute
not be enforced absent a real health purpose justification.”).
248
140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
249
Id. at 2113 (plurality opinion) (“Act 620 requires any doctor who performs abortions
to hold ‘active admitting privileges at a hospital that is located not further than thirty miles
from the location at which the abortion is performed or induced and that provides obstetrical
or gynecological health care services.’” (quoting LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1061.10(A)(2)(a))).
250
Id. (“[T]hree abortion clinics and two abortion providers . . . alleged that Act 620 was
unconstitutional because (among other things) it imposed an undue burden on the right of
their patients to obtain an abortion.”).
251
June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 35 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d sub
nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Russo,
140 S. Ct. 2103.
252
Id. at 40.
253
Id. at 41. While the court discussed six doctors, one had decided to discontinue once
the clinic near him closed. See id. at 41–44.
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doctors had not been able to get the required admitting privileges.254 While one
doctor had obtained admitting privileges,255 those admitting privileges were accorded
because “he regularly admit[ted] patients to the hospital as part of his private OB/GYN
practice,” not because of his abortion practice.256 Another doctor had been able to
obtain admitting privileges in New Orleans but not near Baton Rouge.257
If the ability to perform abortions was predicated on obtaining admitting privileges,
then an important issue involved the conditions under which those admitting privileges
could be granted or denied. “There [was] no state or federal statute . . . govern[ing] . . .
the granting” of such privileges in Louisiana258 nor even a law specifying how soon
a hospital would have to act on an application.259 The lack of such regulation in effect
permitted a hospital to deny an application through inaction.260
Some of the criteria for such privileges are “non-competency based”261—for
example, that the physician have treated a large number of patients at the hospital
during the previous year, which would mean that “an obstetrician with 38 years’ experience” might be denied admitting privileges for a non-competency-based reason.262
254

Id. at 42 (“Despite beginning his efforts to get admitting privileges at a nearby hospital
in July 2014, Doe 1 still does not have active admitting privileges at a hospital within 30
miles of Hope Clinic.”); id. (“Doe 2 has been unsuccessful in getting active admitting privileges
within 30 miles of Bossier and, prior to Causeway’s closure, had been able to obtain only
limited privileges, which did not meet the requirements of Act 620, within 30 miles of
Causeway.”); id. at 43 (“[Doe 4] was not able to get admitting privileges at a hospital within
30 miles of Causeway.”). However, “[w]hen Doe 4 maintained a full OB/GYN practice, he
had admitting privileges at four hospitals in the Baton Rouge area. He was required to have
admitting privileges to do OB/GYN surgery and, in his words, ‘to deliver babies.’” Id. Doe
6, who had only been providing medication abortions, had not been successful “in his efforts
to get active admitting privileges.” Id. at 44.
255
Doe 3 had admitting privileges. See id. at 43; see also id. at 77 (“[A]t the time Act 620 was
passed, only one of the six doctors performing abortions, Doe 3, had admitting privileges at a
hospital and he maintained these admitting privileges for years in order to facilitate his general
OB/GYN practice which was and is unrelated to that portion of his practice performing
abortions at Hope.”).
256
Id. at 43.
257
Id. (“Doe 5 has been successful in getting active admitting privileges within 30 miles
of Women’s Health in New Orleans but has been unsuccessful in his efforts to get active
admitting privileges within 30 miles of Delta in Baton Rouge.”).
258
Id. at 44.
259
Id. at 45 (“Unlike some states, there is also no statute or rule in Louisiana which sets
a maximum time period within which a physician’s application for admitting privileges must
be acted upon.”).
260
Id. (“[U]nless there is such a time limit in the hospital’s by-laws, a hospital can effectively
deny a doctor’s application of privileges by never acting on it, a decision on any one doctor’s application permanently delayed without a consequence being effected or a reason being given.”).
261
Id. at 46.
262
See June Medical Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2122 (2020) (plurality
opinion) (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312 (2016)).
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Further, precisely because of the safety of abortion procedures, it would be unlikely
that a physician focused primarily or solely on an abortion practice would have
enough referrals to either obtain or retain admitting privileges.263
As a separate matter, the district court noted “an abundance of evidence introduced at the hearing demonstrating that hospitals can and do deny privileges for
reasons directly related to a physician’s status as an abortion provider.”264 That might
be because individuals at the hospital would refuse to recommend a doctor who was
an abortion provider due to their opposition to abortion rather than questions regarding
the individual’s competence265 or because physicians who object to abortion would
refuse to cover for an abortion provider, and having such coverage might be a condition of obtaining admitting privileges.266
Because of the animus toward abortion, the plaintiffs and even one of the
hospitals granting privileges to an abortion provider requested to proceed anonymously.267 Further, each of the clinics had to hire extra security because of frequent
demonstrations by anti-abortion activists, some of which were violent.268
Sometimes, anti-abortion activists would try to interfere with an abortion provider’s
admitting privileges at a local hospital,269 which in one instance led to an ultimatum that
a physician choose between providing abortion services and remaining employed at or
associated with a hospital.270 Another abortion provider testified that if he were the
only provider in his region (or in the state as a general matter), he would cease providing abortions out of safety concerns and out of concern for his ability to continue
his non-abortion practice.271
The district court made numerous findings including that: (1) a purpose of the
law was “to make it more difficult for abortion providers to legally provide abortions”;272 (2) Louisiana abortions were already “very safe procedures with very few
263

Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 50 (“Because, by all accounts, abortion complications are
rare, an abortion provider is unlikely to have a consistent need to admit patients.”).
264
Id. at 47.
265
Id. at 48 (“Although competent, an abortion provider can face difficulty in getting the
required staff references because of staff opposition to abortion.”).
266
See id. at 49 (“[O]pposition to abortion can present a major, if not insurmountable
hurdle, for an applicant getting the required covering physician.”).
267
Id. at 51–52 (“The security concerns even went beyond the Parties, however. A request
for anonymity was made on behalf of a hospital which had granted privileges to Doe 5 and
the non-party doctors who assisted in the privileges request.”).
268
Id. at 52.
269
Id.
270
Id. (“When Doe 5 worked as a hospital employed physician, protests outside the hospital caused the hospital administration to give him an ultimatum: quit performing abortions
or resign from the hospital staff.”).
271
Id. at 53 (“As a result of his fears, and the demands of his private OB/GYN practice,
Doe 3 has testified that if he is the last physician performing abortion in either the entire state
or in the northern part of the state, he will not continue to perform abortions.”).
272
Id. at 59.
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complications”;273 (3) the “medical benefits which would flow from Act 620 [were]
minimal and . . . outweighed by the burdens which would flow from this legislation”;274 and (4) the law “will not improve the safety of abortion in Louisiana.”275
The court explained why as a practical matter the law was very unlikely to
promote women’s health. Even if the physician who had performed the abortion did
not have admitting privileges, a patient in need of care would be admitted to a
hospital and would not “receive a lesser standard of care.”276 Further, when there are
complications, most do not occur at the clinic.277 A patient experiencing complications would be advised to go to the nearest hospital, which might well mean that a
physician’s admitting privileges at a hospital near the clinic would be irrelevant
because the patient would be told to go to a hospital near her rather than near the
clinic.278 All of these reasons suggested that the state would not significantly improve
women’s health by requiring admitting privileges both because there were already
relatively few instances in which there were complications and also because the
physicians having those privileges in a hospital near the clinic would likely not affect
the healthcare given to the woman who had had complications. The district court
noted in addition that “limiting access to legal abortions substantially increase[s] the
risk of harm to women’s health by increasing the risks associated with self-induced
or illegal and unlicensed abortions.”279
The district court concluded that the law would likely undermine women’s
health.280 Because two of the three remaining clinics would not have abortion providers and because the other clinic would lose one of its providers, the sole remaining
clinic would not be able to provide the services needed in the state.281 Because of the
law’s “substantial burdens” and the lack of evidence that it had “any significant health
273

Id.
Id.
275
Id. at 64.
276
Id.
277
Id. at 65.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 66; see also Ratelle, supra note 85, at 203–04 (“People are more likely to attempt
self-induced abortion when access to safe, legal, and clinic-based abortion care is restricted.”);
id. at 197–98 (discussing “the dangerous history of illegal abortions”); Rachael N. Pine &
Sylvia A. Law, Envisioning a Future for Reproductive Liberty: Strategies for Making the
Rights Real, 27 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 407, 416 (1992) (“Such laws force
only women to . . . confront the significant risks of illegal abortion.”).
280
See Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d at 66 (“Act 620 would do very little, if anything, to
advance women’s health and indeed would, by limiting access to legal abortions, substantially
increase the risk of harm to women’s health by increasing the risks associated with selfinduced or illegal and unlicensed abortions.”).
281
Id. at 80 (“If Act 620 were to be enforced, two of the three remaining clinics—Hope
and Delta—would have no abortion provider, with the one remaining clinic (Women’s) without
one of the two doctors that normally serves its patients. . . . Furthermore, since Women’s
Health would be the only clinic to serve all the women of Louisiana, it clearly could not
perform that task as a logistical matter.”).
274
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benefits,” the district court found that the law “places an unconstitutional undue
burden on women seeking abortion in Louisiana.”282
Reversing the trial court,283 the Fifth Circuit found that “the Act does not impose
a substantial burden on a large fraction of women,”284 justifying that conclusion for
a number of reasons. For example, the circuit court decided that the physicians were
themselves to blame for their failure to gain admitting privileges,285 which meant
that this failure could not be attributed to the Act.286 The court reasoned that the Act
would not cause driving distances to increase in Louisiana because all three clinics
could remain open if doctors were able to get admitting privileges.287
One of the surprising aspects of the Fifth Circuit’s opinion was how markedly
it diverged from the findings of fact of the district court opinion.288 Indeed, the State
of Louisiana had not contested that several of the physicians had put in a good-faith
but ultimately unsuccessful effort to obtain admitting privileges,289 but the Fifth
Circuit nonetheless concluded that the physicians had not put in the requisite effort.290
The Russo Court reversed the Fifth Circuit decision,291 but nonetheless made the
abortion jurisprudence even less clear than it was before. The Russo plurality implied
that the decision was straightforward because this case was a mirror image of Hellerstedt, where a similar law with similar effects was struck down as unconstitutional.292
282

Id. at 86.
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 815 (5th Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
284
Id. at 791.
285
Id. at 811 (“Here, by contrast, there was clear evidence in the record before the district
court that various doctors failed to seek admitting privileges in good faith.”).
286
See id. at 807 (“[T]here is insufficient evidence to conclude that, had the doctors put forth
a good-faith effort to comply with Act 620, they would have been unable to obtain privileges.”).
287
Id. at 811 (“Because all three clinics could remain open, the Act will cause no increase
in driving distance for any woman . . . .”).
288
Id. at 816 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (“The divergence between the findings of the
district court and the majority is striking—a dissonance in findings of fact inexplicable to
these eyes as I had not thought that abortion cases were an exception to the coda that
appellate judges are not the triers of fact.”).
289
Id. at 819 (“The state did not challenge the district court’s findings that Does 2, 5, and
6 each put in a good-faith effort to obtain admitting privileges—a plain waiver.”).
290
Id. at 819–20 (“Undeterred, the majority simply finds the opposite.”).
291
June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2132 (majority upholding the district
court’s factual and legal determinations); see also id. at 2142 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the
judgment) (“I concur in the judgment of the Court that the Louisiana law is unconstitutional.”).
292
Id. at 2113 (plurality opinion) (“We have examined the extensive record carefully and
conclude that it supports the District Court’s findings of fact. Those findings mirror those
made in Whole Woman’s Health in every relevant respect and require the same result. We
consequently hold that the Louisiana statute is unconstitutional.”); see also id. at 2139
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Under principles of stare decisis, I agree with
the plurality that the determination in Whole Woman’s Health that Texas’s law imposed a
substantial obstacle requires the same determination about Louisiana’s law.”).
283

404

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:367

To some extent, Russo merely suggested that the district court findings were supported in the record and thus could not be displaced by the circuit court.293
The plurality and dissenting opinions reflected the district court and circuit court
opinions respectively. The plurality discussed some of the non-competency-based
reasons that a competent physician might be denied admitting privileges, including
that the very safety of the abortion practice would result in the physician having too
few hospital admissions to qualify for obtaining or retaining admitting privileges.294
The plurality also suggested that “opposition to abortion played a significant role in
some hospitals’ decisions to deny admitting privileges.”295
The dissents reflected the Fifth Circuit opinion in suggesting that the law had
not been shown to impose an undue burden on abortion. Justice Alito implied that
the physicians who did not obtain admitting privileges did not try hard enough to do
so.296 Justice Gorsuch suggested that the law would not impose an undue burden on
abortion because enforcement of the law might result in hospitals modifying their
admitting privilege policies or because clinics might move closer to hospitals that
would grant admitting privileges.297 Both Justices Gorsuch and Alito suggested that
the admitting privileges requirement might promote women’s health.298
The differing views about whether the statute would significantly promote
women’s health were likely due, at least in part, to the differing implicit questions
that were being asked. The district court and the plurality were trying to assess how
293

See id. at 2121 (plurality opinion) (“Where ‘the district court’s account of the evidence
is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse
it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed
the evidence differently.’ Anderson [v. Bessemer City], 470 U.S. [564,] 573–74 [(1985)]. ‘A
finding that is “plausible” in light of the full record—even if another is equally or more
so—must govern.’ Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 (2017).”).
294
See id. at 2123 (plurality opinion).
295
Id.
296
Id. at 2165 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]hose challenging Act 620 [should] demonstrate that
the doctors who lack admitting privileges attempted to obtain them with the same zeal they
would have exhibited if the Act were in effect and they stood to lose by failing in those efforts.”).
297
See id. at 2177 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision also appears to assume
that, if Louisiana’s law took effect, not a single hospital would amend its rules to permit
abortion providers easier access to admitting privileges; no clinic would choose to relocate
closer to a hospital that offers admitting privileges rather than permanently close its doors;
the prospect of significant unmet demand would not prompt a single Louisiana doctor with
established admitting privileges to begin performing abortions; and unmet demand would not
induce even one out-of-state abortion provider to relocate to Louisiana.”).
298
Id. at 2155 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is ample evidence in the record showing
that admitting privileges help to protect the health of women by ensuring that physicians who
perform abortions meet a higher standard of competence than is shown by the mere
possession of a license to practice.”); id. at 2172 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Louisiana
legislature passed Act 620 only after extensive hearings at which experts detailed how the
Act would promote safer abortion treatment.”).
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much women’s health would be improved by the law’s enforcement, starting from
the vantage point that in Louisiana abortions were already “very safe procedures with
very few complications.”299 But with that as a starting point, there was virtually “no
room for improvement,”300 which would make it difficult for the state to establish
that the law would be likely to promote women’s health. When Justices Alito and
Gorsuch talked about how having more demanding standards might result in better
outcomes,301 they seemed to be implicitly addressing whether the law was passed for
pretextual reasons.302 For example, it might seem legitimate and non-pretextual to
“protect the health of women by ensuring that physicians who perform abortions
meet a higher standard of competence.”303 However, were that really the concern,
then one would expect a cost-benefit analysis focusing on how many adverse outcomes might be avoided by having higher standards and, in addition, how many
adverse outcomes might occur because the supply of physicians performing abortions had been reduced.304 In any event, even if a regulation was intended to promote
and in fact promoted women’s health a little bit, that would not prevent its imposing
an undue burden on abortion if its enforcement would result in very few women
being able to obtain abortions.
One of the issues highlighted in Russo was whether the Hellerstedt Court had
modified Casey.305 Chief Justice Roberts noted, “Under Casey, the State may not
impose an undue burden on the woman’s ability to obtain an abortion.”306 However,
299

See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 59 (M.D. La. 2017), rev’d
sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018), rev’d sub nom.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103.
300
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 342 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
301
See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
302
Cf. Caitlin E. Borgmann, Borrowing from Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine in
Analyzing Abortion Clinic Regulations, 26 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 41, 51 (2016) (“If
a state treats abortion differently (and more burdensomely) than comparable medical
procedures but cannot justify the differential treatment on medical grounds, it is likely that
the purpose is a pretext for the state’s ideological opposition to abortion.”).
303
See Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2155 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2172 (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting) (“In Act 620, Louisiana’s legislature found that requiring abortion providers to
hold admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of the clinic where they perform
abortions would serve the public interest by protecting women’s health and safety.”).
304
Cf. Cathren Cohen, “Beyond Rational Belief”: Evaluating Health-Justified Abortion
Restrictions After Whole Woman’s Health, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 173, 176
(2018) (“[R]equirements that only physicians provide abortion care . . . are purportedly
justified by states’ interest in protecting women’s health, but such claims are not based on
empirical evidence. In fact, these laws can often lead to adverse health outcomes for women
seeking abortions.”).
305
Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2153 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In Whole Woman’s Health, . . .
[Casey] was altered.”); cf. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324
(2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even taking Casey as the baseline, however, the majority
radically rewrites the undue-burden test in three ways.”).
306
Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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he suggested, that test was modified when “the Court in Whole Woman’s Health
added the following observation: ‘The rule announced in Casey . . . requires that courts
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits
those laws confer.’”307
To explain the difficulty that he believed was presented, he noted that in Casey
the twenty-four-hour waiting period would not only lead to a delay but would increase the costs of abortion.308 However, he explained, those costs notwithstanding,
the district court did not find that the waiting period imposed a substantial obstacle.309
He then concluded, “Because the law did not impose a substantial obstacle, Casey
upheld it . . . notwithstanding the District Court’s finding that the law did ‘not further
the state interest in maternal health.’”310
Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis needs to be unpacked. First, he omitted why the
district court failed to find that the waiting period imposed a substantial burden—namely, that the district court struck down that requirement under the thenprevailing standard, and thus, of course, did not in addition analyze whether the
requirement was unduly burdensome because it failed a not-yet-adopted standard.311
Chief Justice Roberts’s conclusion that the requirement in fact did not impose a
substantial burden merely because the district court did not foresee that the plurality
would later adopt the undue burden standard helps illustrate that the Casey plurality
may not have been applying the very standard that it had articulated.312
Chief Justice Roberts’s worry seemed to be that the cost-benefit analysis might
be used to strike down an abortion regulation even if that regulation did not impose
a substantial burden on abortion access. While he recognized that such a statute would
still have to be rationally related to a legitimate state interest in order to pass muster,313
he seemed confident that such a forgiving test would not pose much of a problem.314
Regrettably, Chief Justice Roberts’s example allegedly establishing the difficulty with the cost-benefit analysis only made the jurisprudence murkier. He wrote:
[C]ourts applying a balancing test would be asked in essence to
weigh the State’s interests in “protecting the potentiality of human
307

Id. at 2135 (quoting Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309).
See id. at 2136 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 886
(1992) (plurality opinion)).
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Id.
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Id. at 2136 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion)).
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See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text (discussing the Casey plurality
reversing the district court’s striking of the waiting period).
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Russo, 140 S. Ct. at 2135 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“Laws that do not
pose a substantial obstacle to abortion access are permissible, so long as they are ‘reasonably
related’ to a legitimate state interest.” (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (plurality opinion))).
314
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life” and the health of the woman, on the one hand, against the
woman’s liberty interest in defining her “own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life” on the other.315
Chief Justice Roberts cautioned: “There is no plausible sense in which anyone, let
alone this Court, could objectively assign weight to such imponderable values and
no meaningful way to compare them if there were.”316 Such a task would be impossible and “[a]ttempting to do so would be like ‘judging whether a particular line is
longer than a particular rock is heavy.’”317
Yet, Chief Justice Roberts’s point proves too much. Suppose, for example, that
a particular regulation is independently determined to impose a substantial burden
on abortion access, e.g., because it will cause many clinics to close down. Presumably, the fact that a substantial burden is imposed will not be enough to invalidate
the statute. Instead the Court will want to do a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether closing down so many clinics was justified, e.g., because they posed a
health hazard. But if such cost-benefit analyses simply cannot be done because they
would require comparing protecting women’s health with undermining women’s
liberty interests in defining their own existence, then courts would have difficulty
justifying upholding a statute imposing a substantial burden, even if enforcement of
the regulation would save many women’s lives. By casting doubt on whether costbenefit calculations could ever legitimately be performed by courts, Chief Justice
Roberts cast doubt on whether the Court could find that a regulation should be
upheld despite its imposing a substantial burden on abortion access.
To make matters even more confusing, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that
“[t]he legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special circumstances, to
treat like cases alike. The Louisiana law imposes a burden on access to abortion just
as severe as that imposed by the Texas law, for the same reasons. Therefore Louisiana’s
law cannot stand under our precedents.”318 But then the question becomes what the
Court is supposed to do when a different kind of law imposes an undue burden on
abortion access. Is the Court supposed to use a different analysis if the statute imposes a substantial burden but not “for the same reasons?”319 Or is the question now
whether the burden imposed is “just as severe as that imposed by the Texas [or
Louisiana] law,”320 such that anything less severe could not be considered unduly
burdensome. Regrettably, Russo sheds little light on what qualifies as a substantial
burden on abortion rights.
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(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
318
Id. at 2134.
319
See id.
320
See id.
316

408

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:367

Justice Alito also focused on whether Hellerstedt modified Casey,321 suggesting
that the correct test was whether the Louisiana law “would diminish the number of
abortion providers in the State to such a degree that women’s access to abortions would
be substantially impaired.”322 He noted that “unless an abortion law has an adverse
effect on women, there is no reason why the law should face greater constitutional
scrutiny than any other measure that burdens a regulated entity in the name of health
or safety.”323 But his later analysis cast doubt on whether he was really serious about
using that test. For example, he pointed out that requiring physicians to have attending privileges was designed to help women,324 as if the legislature asserting that
purpose sufficed to establish that it was the purpose.325 Even if that were the purpose, a separate argument would be required to show that a well-intended statute
could not at the same time impose an undue burden on abortion. If, as Hellerstedt
suggested, closing down a substantial number of clinics would impose a substantial
burden on abortion access, that would be true whether the legislature had intended
to impose such a burden or, instead, had incidentally imposed such a burden.
The Casey plurality warned that “a statute which, while furthering the interest in
potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means
of serving its legitimate ends.”326 Good intent does not immunize an abortion statute
from constitutional review. Further, the Casey plurality addressed Chief Justice
Roberts’s worry about cost-benefit analyses of incommensurables—Casey made
clear that a state’s interest in protecting potential life cannot be used to justify
substantially burdening abortion rights.327
In Russo, while Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence and Justice Alito’s dissent
(which was joined at least in part by several Justices)328 differed with respect to
whether the Louisiana law imposed a substantial burden on abortion rights,329 they
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Texas’s law imposed a substantial obstacle requires the same determination about Louisiana’s
law.”), with id. at 2165 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Court should remand this case for a new
trial under the correct legal standards. The District Court should apply Casey’s ‘substantial
obstacle’ test.”).
322

2020]

UNDULY BURDENING ABORTION JURISPRUDENCE

409

agreed about some matters. For example, they agreed on the constitutional test that
should be used when an abortion regulation does not unduly burden abortion rights.
Both suggested that a very deferential standard should be used,330 which means that
a more restrictive understanding of what constitutes an undue burden will in effect
give states wide discretion with respect to abortion regulation.
CONCLUSION
Members of the Court have analyzed whether statutes unduly burdened abortion
rights since the 1970s,331 although the justices neither agreed about what constituted
an undue burden nor even about the implications of such a finding.332 One of the
issues that has repeatedly divided the Court involves when a law’s foreseeable effect
of reducing the number of abortions may be attributed to the law and hence might
constitute an undue burden. For example, laws requiring parental notification unduly
burden abortion rights if there is no judicial bypass, even though the anticipated
obstacle would be due to the actions of a private party (the parent).333 Laws denying
state funding of non-therapeutic or even non-life-threatening abortions may also
result in a reduction in abortions, but such a limitation is not attributed to the state
and hence is not an undue burden.334
Casey was described as providing a new beginning which was to prevent states
from attempting to impose or in fact imposing undue burdens on abortion.335 Regrettably, the plurality did not seem to apply in good faith the announced test,336 and
the disconnect between the test as articulated and the test as applied has continued
since then. For example, the plurality announced a purpose prong but did not apply
it in that case, and the Court has not applied it since.337
The Court continues to employ the undue burden test but is as divided as ever
about what constitutes a substantial obstacle to abortion rights. Some seem to believe
that abortion regulations purportedly intended to improve women’s health cannot
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140 S. Ct. at 2154 (Alito, J. dissenting) (discussing the rational basis test under Lee Optical).
331
See supra notes 7–32 and accompanying text (discussing Bellotti).
332
See supra notes 33–50 and accompanying text.
333
See supra notes 24–32, 57–64 and accompanying text (discussing Bellotti’s judicial
bypass requirement and Maher’s distinction between state- and private-sponsored interference).
334
See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977).
335
See Manian, supra note 131, at 248.
336
See supra Part II.
337
See supra Parts II and III.

410

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 29:367

constitute an undue burden,338 even though such an approach would enable states to
enact very restrictive regulations by affording very slight health benefits.
One difficulty posed by the Court adopting a new standard in Casey is that policies upheld in cases prior to Casey might not have passed muster under the undue
burden test. For example, Casey struck down a regulation imposing an undue burden
on abortion, even though the burden was imposed by a private party (the potentially
abusive husband) rather than the state.339 Presumably, the reason was that the state
passed a regulation where it knew (or should have known) that such a requirement
would result in many women being unable to obtain abortions. But the same analysis
might establish that the state picking out abortion as the only therapeutic procedure
that would not be funded was unconstitutional, even if the state was not responsible
for the underlying poverty of the women who might need that funding.
Hellerstedt and Russo also struck down laws imposing undue burdens, even
where the burden might not be attributed to the State but to hospitals (whose admitting privilege practices were not subject to state regulation).340 In Russo, the
debate was about whether the law rather than the physicians themselves should be
held responsible for the inability to obtain admitting privileges.341 One might expect
that in future cases members of the Court might adopt Justice Gorsuch’s rationale
suggesting that admitting privilege requirements are constitutional because hospitals
or clinics could modify their policies in light of the law or, even if they did not do
so, that would be their decision rather than the state’s decision.342
Russo is worrisome because it significantly undercuts undue burden abortion
jurisprudence while purportedly applying it. Chief Justice Roberts in his concurrence made clear that he believed the regulations at issue in Hellerstedt and Russo
constitutional but that he felt compelled by stare decisis considerations to decide the
cases in the same way.343 But such a view virtually guarantees that the current jurisprudence will not continue, and the only question is how significantly it will change.
Lower courts and state legislatures cannot help but feel that the only guidance that
they have received is that the current jurisprudence cannot be trusted as a guide.
The Casey majority noted that the Court’s power lies “in its legitimacy, a product
of substance and perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to declare what it demands.”344 The majority cautioned that the loss of legitimacy carries a heavy price: “If
338
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the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so would the country be in its
very ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals.”345 But how can the Court’s
legitimacy not be questioned by both those who are pro-life and those who are prochoice when in effect the Court has announced a little more than four months before
a presidential election that it will strike down a law that five members of the Court
do not believe unconstitutional without explaining what jurisprudential changes to
expect in the future. Russo upholds abortion rights for the time being, but a majority
on the Court have signaled that the current approach will not last long.
Will the undue burden test remain? Perhaps, but only because the Court can raise
the bar so high as to what constitutes an undue burden that virtually any regulation that
arguably improves women’s health a little might be viewed as not imposing an undue
burden, and virtually any regulation that does not impose an undue burden must be
upheld. Justice Blackmun once suggested that members of the Court had “cast[] into
darkness the hopes and visions of every woman in this country who had come to
believe that the Constitution guaranteed her the right to exercise some control over
her unique ability to bear children.”346 Russo may represent the last glimmer of light
before that darkness descends, possible appearance to the contrary notwithstanding.
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Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 557 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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